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Statement of the Problem
The Urban Setting
Over the last twenty years we have witnessed extensive
changes in the composition of our urban population, changes
that have greatly intensified the problems of our city
school systems. The exodus of middle-class whites and
the movement of blacks to the cities have effected radical
change in the school population; in many of our large cities
a majority of the inner city school population is now black.
City institutions have yet to adjust to the changing character
of the city population. Pressing needs have been met with
limited responses. Over the last thirty years, cities have
expanded their services to cope with this growth, city
bureaucracies have doubled in size. Unfortunately growth
and expansion have not been paralleled by any fundamental
change in the basic structure of city bureaucracies. Urban
school systems are but a case in point.
Economy and efficiency, civil service reform, profes
sionalism and centralization have characterized the major
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movements in urban governments. All of these factors con
tribute to the development of a remote, static bureau
cratic structure ill equipped to handle the demands of a
new population. Those new demands are for a greater "piece
of the action" that is, "a redistribution of power in the
city to allow the low income minority community a greater
role in the policy process."1 For cities all over the
country, effective action will depend on a breaking down of
the structure and re-evaluation of the ideology that has
governed that structure and denies so large a segment of
the population a voice in its own affairs. As it is now
structured, the large remote city structure cannot be re
sponsive to the needs of the black community; it cannot pro
vide that "piece of the action" that they demand. The sur
vival of America's urban communities as we know them will
depend upon their ability to respond to these pressures.
The city school system is one of the battleground and in
many respects, reflects the larger problem in mocrocosm.
The Urban School Setting
The public education system in our large cities are
paralyzed. Their failure is political as well as educational,
The educational failure is relatively easy to substantiate:
There are sufficient data in test scores, dropout rates,
Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an
American City, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961) pp. 11-
FT.
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the number of academic diplomas produced to establish the
nature of that failure. Rationales developed to relate
the cause of this failure to the problems of a disadvantaged
community, while they may be valid, do not in any way negate
the responsibility of the school system to educate its
clientele. The inability of school professionals to cope
with this problem must still be labeled an educational
failure.l
The political failure can best be described in terms
of the development within the city of a political sub-system
whose policy process is entirely controlled by school board
members located at the various boards of education. The
policies coming out of this elite group supports an educa
tional establishment that maintains a status quo orientation
in all areas of educational policy.
Over the last sixty five years, city school systems
have experienced a high degree of professionalization combined
with extensive centralization of the educational bureaucracy.
In every large city, an inbred bureaucratic supervisory
staff sits at the school board offices holding a tight rein
on educational policy. Their vested interests are clear:
Any major shift in educational policy might well challenge
their control of the local educational system. The only
Herbert Kohl, 36 Children, (New York: New American
Destruction of the Hearts and Minds of Negro Children in the
Library, 1967); Johathan Kozol, Death at an Early Age: The
- - - ile" " ~"
Boston Public Schools (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957)





new agent to enter the area of school affairs in recent
years is the teacher organization or union. Unfortunately
these groups have concentrated their attention on salary
and related issues; on all other questions they have
supported establishment policies.
The specific problem that this study is concerned
with is the relationship between community control of the
schools, parental participation and providing quality educa
tion in the low income minority areas.
Community Control of the Schools
A concept that has aroused both fear and hope is
emerging from the crisis in public education, especially in
the inner city. That concept is that public education will
return to the direct control of the public. Not just the
traditionally "prepared public" i.e., those civic leaders
who serve on city wide boards, or parent-association leaders
who are endowed with organizational skills and college degrees,
or business leaders who recognize good schools as a drawing
card to local economic development, but the parent and
community residents, especially low-income minority inner-
city parents, calling for a say in the operation of public
schools.
■^•Marilyn Gittel, "Teacher Power and Its Implication
for Urban Education," Theory into Practice (April, 1968).
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The prospect is frightening to this "prepared public"
because it would alarm the majority of professional educators
who fear the decentralization of complex systems of educa
tion into the hands of the people thought to be incompetent.
After all, we are not talking about an insignificant thing,
but a vaunted American institution with enormous and growing
capital and operating budgets.
Many argue that community control of the schools is
nothing more than romanticism or naive idealism. An
examination of more hard-core approaches to modern public
education, however, suggests that this idealistic path may
turn out to be the most practical and efficient.
Assumptions underlying the project are:
1. Public education is failing. The most viable
failure is in the urban, low-income racial
minority community.
2. Public education is a governmental function.
It is supported by the public at large and it
is subject at least to review, if not close
accountability, by elected public representa
tives somewhere along the line.
3. While the goals of American public education
are not confined to skill development, the
present operational definition of quality
education is performance in basic skills at
or above grade levels, as measured by
standardized tests.
4. The growing complexity of the education process
is no cause for dismissing the concept of public
control of public education.
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5. Public education is a universal right. There
fore it cannot be limited to those who are
responsive and congenial to whatever the pre
vailing mode of public education happens to be.
6. The public has a right to determine education
al policy and to hold professionals accountable
for implementing policy. Thus when 70 percent
of black children are not reading at grade
level, their parents have a right to question
professional performance since the schools are
supposed to educate everyone.
7. Urban education is synonymous with the educa
tion of low income racial minorities whose
growing despair is both a threat and a
challenge to America's cities. The general
crisis is inextricably linked to the crisis
of urban education.
Major Concepts
The major concepts utilized in this inquiry will include;
administrative decentralization, political decentralization
(community control), school effectiveness, and integration of
the local school with the local community, (parental partici
pation) . Administrative decentralization will mean the
delegation of authority from superior to subordinate in a
bureaucracy. The subordinate, however, continues to remain
dependent on his superior in varying degrees depending on the
extent of the delegation. Political decentralization will
mean the transfer of authority to officials who have been
selected and who are dependent on a clientele. It is assumed
that the elected official exercising his authority can no
longer be manipulated by the former possessor of that authority.
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These officials will have policy-making power over four
critical areas: (1) personal (2) budget (3) curriculum
and (4) pupil policy. Integration of the local school
with the local community will mean the involvement of the
parent in the education of his child, and school effective
ness will mean (1) the performance in basic skills at or
above grade level as measured by standardized tests (2) rates
of absenteeism and (3) rate of suspensions. My hypotheses
in this inquiry are: (1) political decentralization
increases school effectiveness and (2) political decentra
lization of schools facilitates the integration of the local
school with the local community and (3) as a result of
political decentralization, there has been a shift toward
power equalization and participative decision-making.
Methodology
In this explanatory inquiry, my methodology will consist
of an indepth study of one school district (District 7 in
the South Bronx) looking specifically at the impact of the
1969 Decentralization Law and the concept of political
decentralization (community control) on one poverty school
district in the New York city school system. The central
question to which this inquiry addresses itself is: What has
been the effect of political decentralization on school effective
ness: To reach a conclusion, a comparison was made of the
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following data before and after decentralization; academic
performance, specifically reading scores, student absenteeism
and student suspensions. These indicators were selected
to measure changes in school effectiveness. Two of these
indicators - reading scores and student suspensions, had
been singled out by the Bundy Report to characterize the
shortcomings of the New York public school system. In
addition to the central question of effectiveness, answers
to the following questions were also sought: To what extent
has political decentralization facilitated the integration
of the local school with the local community and to what
extent has there been a shift toward power equalization and
participative decision-making as a result of political
decentralization?
New York City was chosen because it was the first large
city to experiment with community control of the schools.
District 7 in the South Bronx was selected for this study
because it has all of the problems you have in the city.
It was the failure of the centralized school system to provide
pupils from poverty areas such as this with basic learning
skills that provoked the demand for decentralization and
community control. It is only fitting, therefore, that the
Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New
York City Schools, Reconnection for Learning: A Community
School System for New York City. November, 1967, p. ?T.
-9-
impact of the Decentralization Law and the attempt at local
control be examined here. Also, it is. in districts such
as this one that decentralization must prove its effective
ness as an instrument of change.
The test of my hypotheses will occur in the comparison
of the data from the study (i.e., reading scores, student
absenteeism rates, student suspension rates) with the pro
positions I have made. For example, if I find that decentra
lization did not effect the integration of the parents and
the community with the local school, or student academic
performance, then my hypotheses will be discontinued.
Data Collection
The data collection process will consist of a library
study of the existing literature on this subject and open-
ended interviews.
Anticipated Results
At the conclusion of this study I should be able to
answer the questions, (1) will decentralization promote the
integration of the local school with the local community and
(2) is there a relationship between this integration of
community and school, and the level of school effectiveness.
Historical Background for Decentralization
When the public schools reopened in the Fall of 1970,
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the New York City public education system prepared itself
to face a new program based on the concept of a decentralized
organizational structure. For the first time, local school
boards, elected by members of the local cummunity, began to
exercise their newly acquired powers over the selection of
staff, choice of teaching materials,and within limits, over
local expenditures.
The move toward decentralization was a response to
widespread dissatisfaction with the public school system. The
reasons for this dissatisfaction are numerous. Many of them
are enumerated in the Bundy Report.1 In 1965, for example,
a statewide evaluation of pupil performance was instituted
by the New York State Education Department. It showed that
of those students in the first through ninth grades who
were below the level of minimum competence in reading and
arithmetic, fifty-five percent were New York City public
school students. This figure gains added significance
when we realize that New York City accounts for only thirty-
five percent of the State's total enrollment.
The Board of Education report covering the 1966-67
school year indicated that one out of three pupils in the
^Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the
New York City Schools, Reconstruction for Learning: A Community
School System for New York City (New York, 1967); referred to
as the Bundy Report, after its chairman, McGeorge Bundy.
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New York City school system was a year or more behind in
reading and arithmetic, compared with national norms.
Furthermore, the proportion of sixth grade pupils in the city
scoring below State defined minimum standards increased from
thirty-one percent to forty-five percent between 1965 and
1966, compared to the statewide increase from twenty percent
to twenty-three percent.
At the high school level, only 43,864, or sixty-eight
percent of the 64,117 students admitted to the city's high
schools and scheduled to graduate in 1967 actually did graduate.
Of those graduating, only 21,364, or about one-third of those
admitted, received academic diplomas.1 The others, for the
most part, were assigned to "general" courses, where no
scholastic standards were set and where students were permitted
2
to "graduate with eighth grade reading scores."
An examination of the distribution of academic diplomas
reveals the great disparity in the performance of black and
Puerto Rican students compared with the performance of white
students. In 1963, for example, of some 21,000 students
receiving academic diplomas, only 331 were Puerto Rican and
762 were black. In other words, despite the fact that forty-
l-Ibid., p. 5
2Ellen Lurie, How to Change the Schools (New York:
Vintage Books, 1971) pp. 44-45.
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five percent of the population was non-white, only five
percent of the academic diplomas went to non-whites. By 1969,
the non-white school population had increased to fifty-five
percent. During the same period black and Puerto Rican
enrollment in academic programs increased to nineteen percent,
only slightly more than the increase in population.1
Approximately 12,000 students were suspended from
school during 1966. Many of them according to the Bundy
Report, had been suspended on relatively minor charges and
without fair hearing. In the same year, there were 500
classes to which no teacher was assigned on a permanent
basis, and teacher absences accounted for an additional
1,500 uncovered classes daily.■*
Pressures For Decentralization
The pressure for the decentralization of the school
system had its origin in two different concepts; one was the
concept of administrative decentralization; the other was the
concept of political decentralization or more specifically,
community control. Administrative decentralization involves
the delegation of authority from superior to subordinate in
^Bundy Report, p. 5.
3Ibid.
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a bureaucracy. The subordinate, however, continues to remain
dependent on his superior in varying degrees depending on the
extent of the delegation. Political decentralization, on the
other hand, involves the transfer of authority to officials
who have been selected by and are dependent for re-election
upon an electorate or clientele. One assumes that the elected
official exercising his authority can no longer be manipulated
by the former possessor of that authority. Community control,
a form of political decentralization, can be defined as the
exercise of authority by a democratically organized govern
ment of a neighborhood jurisdiction.
Dissatisfaction With The Central Bureaucracy
Prior to 1897, each borough had its own Board of
Education, and sent representatives to the New York City Board
of Education, which had nineteen members. With the adoption of
the new City Charter in 1897, however, there began a steady
trend toward centralization. In 1902, the borough boards
were abolished and forty-six local school boards whose members
were appointed by the borough president, were established
instead. Each of the boards sent a representative to the City
Board which had forty-six members. In 1917, the number of members
in the central Board was reduced from forty-six to seven in
the interests of efficiency. The forty-six local boards were
Alan A. Altschuler, Community Control (Indianapolis:
Pegasus Press, 1970), p. 64.
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retained but only in an advisory capacity. This structure
prevailed until 1961.
By 1960, the forty-six local school boards had grown
in number to fifty-four, but for the most part they were
unrepresentative, powerless, and, in many cases, inactive.
In 1961, a major reorganization of both the central and
local boards occurred after a special session of the State
Legislature removed the old Board of Education because of
charges of corruption in school construction. The new
Board of Education established thirty Local School Boards
whose members were to be appointed by the Central Board
rather than by the borough president. The functions of
the newly formed Local School Board, however, remained
advisory only.
By 1967, the New York City public school system had
grown into a vast complex covering the five boroughs and
comprising 870 day schools, more than 2,000 pre-kindergarten
and kindergarten classes, and about 100 evening elementary,
high and trade schools. The school population was over one
million pupils, with educational needs ranging from special
schools and classes for the emotionally and physically
handicapped to special schools and classes for the intellec-
Cresap, McCormick and Paget, "A Brief History of School
Decentralization in New York City," Guidelines for New York City
Community School Boards (New York, 1970); also Governing New
York City Schools (New~York: Public Education Association,
1971), pp. 5 - 6.
2Ibid.
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tually gifted and talented. This complex structure was
staffed by over 60,000 teachers, supported by school
psychologists, social workers, guidance counselors, and
school community coordinators, as well as other technical
and teaching specialists. It was administered by a highly
centralized, many-leveled bureaucracy with headquarters
at 110 Livingston Street in Brooklyn. It was called
the Board of Education.
Traditionally, the function of the public school
system was to provide an educational ladder that was open
to all children despite their widely diversified economical,
social, and cultural backgrounds. For this purpose, a
highly centralized administrative structure was conceived
as suitable.
A distinctive feature of city school systems, and
one that has made them an interesting object of
-study to students of educational administration...
coming from other lands, is the wide diversity
in educational facilities which they provide,
with a resulting adaptability of the instruction
to the needs of the many different classes of
the population. Unlike most European two class
school systems, the American public school has
been compelled to organize its instruction about
a one-track form of educational organization and
provide an educational ladder nominally at least
open to all. The adjustment to the needs of the
different social and intellectual classes which
attend has had to be made by providing a diversity
of types of classes and instruction. This
adaptability has been made possible only by reason
of the unity of its administration and finances,
and it could not have been provided except under
a centralized large scale form of educational
organization . . .
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In addition, due to the concentration of wealth,
which the city usually represents, and with local
school levies made on the city school district as
a whole by one administrative board, a pooling of
costs is made possible which results in the provi
sion of uniform educational advantage to all with
out undue burden to any portion of the whole.i-
In recent years, however, the ability of a highly centra
lized school system to perform this traditional function
had begun to meet with increasing skepticism. Serious
questions began to be raised as to its competence to meet
the urgent needs of a city with a rapidly changing population.
Peter Schrag, executive editor of the "The Saturday Review"
and author of several books and articles about the public
school system, is one of those commenting on this apparent
inadequacy. Referring to the fact that the public school
had always been viewed as the great American social instru
ment, the device that converted the raw material of immigration
into an endless stream of social success, Schrag went on
to say:
Now, oddly enough, the school seems to be failing
in the very function on which its reputation has
always been based. It does not seem to be able
to bring the most indigenous of all "immigrants"
into the main stream or even to give them the
educational qualifications that life in the
main stream requires.2
Schools and Curriculum," Encyclopedia Britannica,
Vol. 20 (1951), p. 85.
2Peter Schrag, "Why our Schools Have Failed," The
Politics of Urban Education, Marilyn Gittell and A. G. Hevesi
(eds.) (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 310.
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To a large extent, the inability of the public
school system to meet the needs of its changing clientele can
be traced to the problems of an overcentralized bureaucracy.
The central Board of Education had a system of formulas
that dictated the application of programs to schools in various
categories without taking into account the gradations within
each category. The effect was to minimize the flexibility
and effective distribution of personnel and materials.
Furthermore, bureaucratic procedures made it almost impossible
to introduce the new materials needed for curriculum change.
Experimental programs, many of which were conducted in
inner-city schools, were hampered by long delays in securing
textbooks and supplies.
Although inner-city schools had many more compensatory
programs and their expenditures per pupil were higher than in
segregated white schools, the bureaucracy hindered the co
herent and integrated use of these services by its failure
to clarify and coordinate the roles of special teachers and
staff members.^ The organization of the Central Board was
characterized by a pattern of multiple authority, which
■'■David Rogers, 110 Livingston Street (New York: Random




violated the principle of unity of command and frustrated
efforts to secure services, facilities, and information.
Headquarters officials were preoccupied with forcing
field personnel to conform to numerous rules and directives.
At the same time, few headquarters professionals or Board
members knew how poorly staffed and equipped the ghetto
schools really were since they rarely visited these schools.
Innovation by field personnel was discouraged. All decisions
about curriculum and instruction were made at central
headquarters despite its remoteness from local conditions.
As a result, field supervisors became so accustomed to their
limited authority and the lack of encouragement that they
practically abandoned any responsibility they may have had
for innovating.2
Finally, the perpetuation of the value system of the
central bureaucracy was ensured by the Board of Examiners.
This Board controlled entry and promotion within the system
through its jurisdiction over the preparation and administra
tion of examinations for teachers, supervisors, and staff
positions. Critics of the Board of Examiners contend that
the rigidity of its control led to inbreeding and mediocrity





If the problem was solely one of finding a suitable
structure to increase the efficiency of the school system,
it is conceivable that conventional theories of management
and organization might have provided a solution. Unfortunate
ly, however, administrative and organizational factors
were not the only elements of the problem. The social and
political factors that provide the second source of pressures
for decentralization were loaded with emotional overtones
that complicated the whole question of decentralization
and community control.
An Awakening Desire for Power
The political and social undercurrents that provided
the second source of pressure for decentralization found
expression in the concepts of political decentralization and
community control. These concepts gained tremendous force
with the failure of integration in the city schools. In the
early 1960's, it became increasingly evident that the black
and Puerto Rican communities were being poorly served by
the public school system. At first desegregation of the
schools was offered as a solution. Integration was quite
compatible with the melting pot tradition of the public schools,
and one wonders what might have happened if serious and
sincere attempts had actually been made to integrate the
schools. The question, of course, is an academic one.
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The frustrating history of the struggle to desegregate
the New York City public schools has been traced by David
Rogers in his book 110 Livingston Street, through four phases:
the academic stage, the voluntary stage, the non-voluntary
stage, and finally the decentralization and community control
stage. During the academic phase, which occupied the period
from 1954 to 1960, the Board of Education made studies,
formed committees, issued reports and policy statements, but
firmly maintained the commitment to the neighborhood school
concept. Only when civil rights protest groups appeared to
have strong local or citywide support did the Board make
any concessions and sometimes not even then.
During this period, black inner-city groups, with
the support of white liberals, focused their attention on
the construction of schools in fringe areas rather than in
areas whose housing patterns would ensure continued segre
gation. The response of the Board was minimal. The frustra
tion of the community during 1958 and 1959 stemming from
the inability of black parents to send their children to
schools outside the district was reflected in a series of
strikes and boycotts.
The period from 1960to>1963, the voluntary stage,
witnessed the introduction of Open Enrollment. This was a
voluntary transfer plan that had been designed to promote
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desegregation, but which received little support from
the Board. Instructions on what schools their children
could attend and how they could get to them were rarely
given to parents, and many parents whose children were
eligible for transfer were not aware of it. The limited
success Open Enrollment had in a few areas could be
attributed to the efforts of civil rights workers.
With the failure of Open Enrollment, the inadequacy
of voluntary techniques was clearly evident, and in May, 1963
desegregation moved into its non-voluntary phase. The Board
of Education was requested by James Allen, the State Education
Commissioner, to submit a report on the racial composition
of the New York City schools. The report was to include a
statement of plans to re-examine "racial imbalance" in
schools in which there was a substantial departure from a
fifty-fifty black-white ratio. Following a series of school
boycotts organized for the purpose of bringing pressure to
bear on the Board of Education, the Board announced its
desegregation program on May 28, 1964.
The plan called for four pairings of elementary
schools, the rezoning of eight junior high schools, and
shifts of sixth and eighth graders into new junior high
school and high school arrangements.
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Prior to the release of the Board's plans, the
Allen Commission released its own plan. This Commission
had been appointed by Commissioner Allen at the request of
the Board of Education for the purpose of suggesting specific
desegregation proposals. These recommendations, released
in April, 1964, called for four-year middle schools organized
in educational parks in order to draw from a large
heterogenous population. It also called for much more
fringe area construction.
In April 1965, the Board announced a new statement
of policy, which committed the Board to a major reorganiza
tion of the school system along the lines of the Allen
Report. Included in its plan were new four-year inter
mediate schools, and some pre-kindergarten programs in
minority group areas. Although all civil rights groups
joined in commending the statement, little was done by the
Board toward its implementation.
By the end of 1965, civil rights leaders and
others who had carried the brunt of the desegregation battle
were demoralized. The black community gave up pressing
the New York City Board of Education for more desegregation.
Instead, parents turned away from the possibility of
achieving quality education for their children through
integration and toward community participation and control.
In the decentralization and community control phase,
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black groups concerned with the inability of the schools to
educate black and Puerto Rican children and frustrated
by the power of school professionals to subvert desegre
gation plans, turned their efforts toward diluting that
power. The coincidence of this awakening desire for power
among the urban poor with the trend toward decentraliza
tion has been noted by Fantini and Gittell. At the same
time, they point to some important distinctions between
the concept of administrative decentralization and that of
community control.
Coinciding with an awakening desire among the urban
poor for power is a trend toward decentralization of
services. This impetus, however, is more a matter
of administrative efficiency than of responsiveness
to community desires. It recognizes the difficulty
of prescribing at the center uniform rules and
procedures that can apply equally effectively
across the whole or a large and diverse city. It
acknowledges, furthermore, the deadening effect on
the invitation and creativity of personnel, to say
nothing of morale in centralized decision making
in all matters. It is, in short, the counterpart
at the governmental level, of a practice long
followed by many large corporations that have
discovered that decentralization is more effective
and profitable than a rein held tightly at the
center. Administrative decentralization of
government, however, should not be mistaken for
community controlL or participation. It can facili
tate community participation by locating the
decision-making agencies close at hand. But it is
no guarantee in and of itself of community partici
pation. In some instances indeed, a decentralized
agency of government, if it lacks sufficient decison
making authority, can frustrate community desires ■,
by deflecting them from the real seat of authority.
1Mario Fantini, Marilyn Gittell, and Richard Magat,
Community Control and the Urban School (New York: Praeger,
1970), p. 13.
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The Convergence of the Concepts of Administrative
Decentralization and Community ControT
In the Spring of 1967, the concepts of administra
tive decentralization and community control gathered momentum
and converged on a collision course. In response to growing
pressure from the black community for control of their own
schools, the Board of Education announced a policy that led
to the establishment of three demonstration districts, Two
Bridges, the Intermediate School 201 complex and Ocean
Hill-Brownsville, as an experiment in local community control
of schools.
At about the same time that these experimental dis
tricts were getting under way, administrative decentralization
was gaining support from a different quarter. During the
administration of Mayor Wagner, the Temporary Commission on
City Finances had pointed out that the City stood to profit
financially if it divided the school system into five school
districts. State aid for school districts in New York State
takes into account the ability of the local district to
finance its schools through property taxation. The device
used to allocate State aid is an aid ratio that determines the
State's share of total approved operating expenses. The aid
ratio for each school district varies, depending upon the
relation of the full value of taxable real property in the
district to the statewide average. Every district, regardless
of wealth, however, receives a minimum amount of aid. As a
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result, New York City received far less aid than it
would otherwise have received if State aid had been com
puted on a county-by-county basis, considering each county,
or borough a separate district. Mayor Lindsay used
this decentralization idea as a way of obtaining additional
State aid and suggested it to the State Legislature.
In the Spring of 1967, the New York State Legislature
passed an education bill that granted the New York City schools
an additional $54 million in State aid if the school system
was divided according to boroughs. The Legislature went one
step further, however. It called upon the Mayor to present
a plan for greater community participation in the governance
of the city schools.
In response to this request, Mayor Lindsay appointed
an advisory panel headed by McGeorge Bundy, President of the
Ford Foundation. Among the recommendations made by this
panel in its report to the Mayor were: (1) the formation of
between thirty and sixty community school districts, each to
be governed by a Board of Education selected in part by
the Mayor; (2) the Community Board should have broad personnel
powers, including the right to hire a community superinten
dent; and (3) the community Board should have authority over
■'■Marilyn Gittell, Participants and Participation (New
York: Praeger, 1967), p. FT.
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elementary and secondary education within its boundaries.
In January 1968, the Mayor accepted most of the
recommendations. The Board of Education opposed the
Bundy-Lindsay plan, and proposed continuing with its own
experiment in decentralization. The State Board of Regents
rejected the Central Board's plan as inadequate and
indecisive, and submitted a proposal of its own. The
Regents recommended that the Central Board be replaced by a
five member Board appointed by the Mayor and that the basic
power and duties the Board exercised under the State
Education Law be shifted to new semi-autonomous Community
School Boards.
A decision on administrative decentralization was
delayed for a year by the Legislature first dealing with
the passage in May 1968 of the Marchi Bill named after
its sponsor, State Senator John J. Marchi, a Republican
from Staten Island and Chairman of the Senate Committee on
New York City. Despite the delay, however, the bill did leave
the door open for further movement in the direction of decentra
lization if the Mayor and the Board of Education so desired.
To facilitate such movement, the bill provided four more
places on the Board, which were promptly filled by Mayor
Lindsay with proponents of decentralization. It also removed
an obstacle to decentralization by authorizing the Board
to delegate its powers to the community school districts.
Bundy Report, pp. iii - iv.
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Unfortunately, for the future course of administra
tive decentralization, it was at this moment in time that the
concept of community control became the central issue in
a bitter confrontation involving the Ocean Hill-Brownsville
demonstration district and the United Federation of
Teachers. The dispute began early in May 1968 with the in
voluntary transfer of nineteen teachers by the local govern
ing board of the Ocean Hill-Bronwsville Demonstration Dis
trict; it culminated in a series of strikes by teachers and
supervisors that began on September 9, 1968, and lasted
until November 15, 1968. During most of this period, more
than ninety percent of the city's teachers and supervisors
were out on strike, and more than ninety-five percent of
the city's pupils were absent from school.
The strike opened deep wounds and left scars in a
city that was already badly divided.
The strike heightened tension and conflict throughout
the city. It fractured old coalitions between
organized labor and the civil rights movement, for
example. It caused internal ruptures in formerly
cohesive groups; the liberal establishment, for one,
found itself torn between, on the one hand, its
affinity for the oppressed and, on the other, its
traditional loyalty to the hard-won prerogatives of
labor unions.
lMIt's the Most Effective of Four Teacher Strikes,"
The New York Times, September 10, 1968, p. 36; also M. Garber,
"Extra Schooling is Due For a Time," The New York Times,
October 18, 1968, p. 1.
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But the fractures followed other lines too. Since
the majority of New York's teachers and supervisors
are Jewish, several Jewish organizations tended to
side with the U. F. T. Their opposition intensi
fied with the surfacing of anti-Semitic remarks and,
occasionally, pamphlets.
Not the least of the divisions arose between
striking and non-striking teachers throughout the
city. Some younger teachers, in particular, did
not regard the union picket line as inviolate. For
their part, some union teachers could not forgive
the actions of their colleagues who had not
participated.1
In its analysis of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville contro
versy, the New York Civil Liberties Union made a point of
differentiating administrative decentralization from
community control:
Integration failed at least partly because it was
resisted by many principals and because the system
was already administratively decentralized to the
point where resisting principals were not forced
to comply with board policy on integration.
Once the Board of Education understood that what
the Ocean Hill-Brownsville parents really wanted
was an experiment in genuine community control, it
retreated even before it had begun. Almost
immediately, the board began to talk about community
involvement as opposed to community control.^
The Enactment of the Decentralization Law
On September 4 and 11, 1968, amidst the turmoil of
1-Fantini, Gittell, and Magat, Community Control and the
Urban School (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 164-165.
2New York Civil Liberties Union, "The Burden of Blame:
A Report on the Ocean Hill-Brownsville School Controversy,"
in Gittell and Hevesi, Politics of Urban Education, pp. 339 -
342.
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the initial stages of the teachers strike, the newly re
constituted Board of Education delegated limited powers to
the Local School Board. In December, it published a pro
posal for a long-range plan for a system of semi-autonomous
community school districts within limits established by the
March Law. In February, 1969, these proposals were sub
mitted to the State Legislature by the New York State Board
of Regents along with the Regents' own proposals. With
the violence and severity of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville con
troversy and the divisiveness of teachers' strike fresh in
their minds, the legislators undertook consideration of the
various decentralization proposals. The bill that finally
emerged from the Legislature on April 30, 1969 was a product
of pressure, negotiation and compromise. Although the
1969 Decentralization Law and the events leading to its
enactment will be discussed at greater length in the
ensuing chapter entitled "The 1969 Decentralization Law,"
it can be noted at this point that its provisions met with
something less than universal approval.
Under these provisions, the previous Central Board
was to be replaced by an "interim" Board of Education com
prising five members, each appointed by one of the five
Borough Presidents. The "interim" Board, in turn, was
to be replaced in May 1970 with a new seven-member Board,
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comprising two members to be appointed by the Mayor and
five members to be elected by the voters in their respective
boroughs. This provision was later ruled to be in violation
of the one-man, one-vote guidelines by Federal courts.
When the Legislature reconvened in January 1970, the term
of the "interim" Board was extended still another year. In
February 1972, the Legislature once again extended the
life of the interim Board, this time until June 30, 1974.
The decentralization design under the 1969 Law was
structured with certain areas designated as the domain of
the Community School Boards, but with control retained
centrally through the Chancellor and the Central Board of
Education. The Community School Boards have the power to
select a Superintendent for the district, who,in addition
to his educational duties, exercises the managerial functions
of planning, organizing, staffing, directing and controlling
within the limitations imposed by the Central Board, the
Chancellor, and the Community School Board.
Although the powers assigned to the Community School
Boards involved significant changes in the nature of the
relationship that had characterized the interaction of
Local School Boards, community groups, and district Superin
tendents in the past, the provisions of the Law were far
less sweeping than had been desired by the advocates of
community control. It was this disenchantment with the Law
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that contributed, at least in part, to the low voter
turnout for the Community School Board elections that
were held in March 1970. As little as five percent of those
eligible voted in some districts. Other factors contributing
to the low turnout were the residency requirements,and the
complexity of the pre-registration and voting procedures.1
In any case, there was some question as to how closely
the Community School Boards reflected the composition of
the districts they had been elected to represent. Along
with their other problems, therefore, an important task
that faced some of the Community Boards was to establish
their legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents.
Decentralization and School Effectiveness
My study is concerned with the impact of the 1969
Decentralization Law and the concept of political decentra
lization (community control) on one poverty school district
in the New York City school system. The central question
to which this inquiry addressess itself is: What has been
the effect of political decentralization on school effective
ness in New York City school District Seven in the Bronx?
To reach a conclusion, a comparison was made of the following
* ,_ l?^lton H' Demas» She School Elections: A Critique
of the 1969 New York City School Decentralization ^New York-
Institute of Community Studies, 1971)—"
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data before and after decentralization: academic perfor
mance, specifically reading scores, student absenteeism
and student suspensions. These indicators were selected
to measure changes in school effectiveness. Two of these
indicators, reading scores, and student suspensions, had
been singled out by the Bundy Report to characterize the
shortcomings of the New York public school system and were
consequently adopted as effectiveness indicators in this
study.1 The other indicator, student absenteeism, was
selected because it is a response frequently observed among
particpants in a system that they believe is failing them.
Advocates of political decentralization/community con
trol had not only hypothesized that restructuring the school
system would lead to more effective schools, but they had
also indicated the specific changes that would contribute
to this increase in effectiveness. The redistribution and
equalization of power was seen as a major change that would
in turn, lead to the integration of school and community
(parental participation). Therefore, in addition to the
central question of effectiveness, answers to the following
questions were also sought:
1. To what extent has there been a shift toward power
equalization and participative decision making
as a result of decentralization?
2. To what extent has decentralization facilitated
the integration of the local school with the local
community?
^Bundy Report, p. 4.
CHAPTER II
THE 1969 DECENTRALIZATION LAW
In a sense, the 1969 Decentralization Law had its
origins in the Bundy Report. This description of the re
lationship, however, is appropriate only in terms of
legislative process and not in terms of content. On
the contrary, the provisions of the decentralization law that
emerged from the legislature were quite different from the
recommendations of the Bundy Panel that had been created
at the request of the Legislature.
It was in response to an Act of the 1967 State
Legislature that New York City's Mayor John V. Lindsey cre
ated the Advisory Committee on the Decentralization of
the New York City Schools. The Act directed the Mayor to:
Prepare a comprehensive study and report and for
mulate a plan for the creation and redevelopment
of educational policy and administrative units
within the city school district of the City of
New York with adequate authority to foster
greater community initiative and participation
in the development of educational policy for
the public schools. . .
and to achieve greater flexibility in the admini
stration of such schools.^
The Committee was appointed on April 30, 1967. By
November, 1967 it was ready with its report, Reconnection
1Bundy Report, p. i.
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for Learning: A Community School System for New York
City better known as the Bundy Report after its chairman,
Ford Foundation President McGeorge Bundy. In the covering
letter to Mayor Lindsay that accompanied the Report,
the Bundy Panel described the concepts that provided the
foundation for its decentralization design:
We have designed this plan of decentralization so
that Community Boards may have as much authority
as is consistent with citywide necessities. We
have sought to be responsive to the deep and
legitimate desire of many communities in the city
for a more direct role in the education of their
children. We are deeply concerned with the need
for participation, for responsibility, for shared
authority and concern. We believe that, with
exceptions where leadership has been exceptional,
the schools of New York have been dangerously
separated from many of New York's communities.
It is of no use to say that others in the past
have accepted a distant discipline and learned well
from accepting unfamiliar authority. The proposi
tion is open to doubt, on its own merits, and it
simply does not apply at all to the state of
mind in the urban ghetto today. The liberating
force for the urban education of the Negro and the
Puerto Rican must be a new respect, a new engagement,
a new responsibility.1
The Bundy Report made the following recommendations:
1) The New York City public school system should be reorga
nized into a community school system comprising a central
education agency and between thirty and sixty autonomous
school districts; 2) Each community school district would
Covering letter for the report of the Mayor's
Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New York City
Schools, submitted to the Mayor Dovember 9, 1967.
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have authority for all regular elementary and secondary
education in the schools within the district. The central
education agency would have operating responsibility for
special educational functions, citywide educational
policies, and centralized services if the community school
district desired them. The State Commissioner of Education
and the central agency would continue to be responsible for
maintaining educational standards in all public schools
in the city; and 3) The community school districts would
be governed by community school boards, six of whose
members would be chosen by a panel that had been elected
by the parents of children attending schools in the
district. There would also be five members selected
by the Mayor (after consultation with parents and
community organizations) from lists of qualified persons
presented by the central education agency.
The Bundy Panel suggested two alternatives for the
central education agency: a commission of three full-time
members appointed by the Mayor, or a full time nine-member
board appointed by the Mayor. Five of the members would
be selected from names submitted by the presidents of the
community school boards. The remaining four would be
selected from names submitted by a screening panel comprising
civic and educational leaders.
Each of the community school districts would receive
a total annual allocation of operating funds determined by
formula. The districts would be permitted the widest possible
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discretion in the use of these funds commensurate with
education standards and goals and compatible with union
contract obligations.
The community school district would have broad person
nel powers, including the power to hire a community
Superintendent. The process of qualification for the
appointment and promotion of teachers and other professional
staff would be revised so that the community school dis
trict would be able to select their personnel from the
widest possible range of sources provided only that the
applicant met State qualifications and that hiring would
be on a competitive basis. Although existing tenure
rights of teachers would be preserved, tenure of new
personnel employed in a particular district would be
awarded by the community school board. ^
The recommendations of the Bundy Report received a
mixed reception. The reaction of the United Federation
of Teachers and of the Council of Supervisory Associations
(C.S.A.) was uncompromising and outright rejection. The
C.S.A.'s response to the Bundy proposals was:
As knowledgeable educators and as forward looking
citizens, we must express our utmost opposition. The
plan gives structural change priority over pupil
progress and welfare. It presumes to increase pub
lic and parent involvement in the schools but
operates so as to vitiate such involvement. It not
only neglects present-day social forces within which
^■Bundy Report, pp. iii - iv, 16 - 40.
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the schools must function but even operates as to
obstruct social progress. Thus, the report, while
it claims to be an attack on the problems of public
education, is really an attack on public education
itself.1
For its part, the U.F.T. was determined to fight any
attempt to transfer power to the local community and, in
particular, any transfer of power that would affect the
hiring and firing, compensation, working conditions,
tenure, and professional prerogatives of teachers. Albert
Shanker, president of the U.F.T., warned that the union
would spend "thousands of dollars, whatever is necessary"
to oppose the Bundy proposals. He predicted that "thousands
of teachers" would leave the school system if the proposals
were adopted without alteration. Shanker was as good as
his word and for the next two years engaged in a running
battle in opposition to decentralization and community
control.
The central Board of Education took the position that
there would be a downgrading of standards and an inequitable
distribution of personnel. Furthermore, the power of the
■"■Council of Supervisory Associations, "Interim Report
No. 2, January, 1968: The Bundy Plan."
2
^■M. A. Farber, "Shanker Sees Teacher Exodus if Bundy
Plan is Adopted as Is," The New York Times, December 4, 1967,
p. 32.
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locally elected boards to appoint teachers and to
determine tenure could result in personal and politically
motivated appointments on a large scale. Alfred
Giardino, president of the central Board who was also a
member of the Bundy Panel but did not sign the report,
contended that "serious problems must arise in recasting
in one quick stroke the largest educational system in the
world. Rather than a rigidly timed and mandated set of
procedures, we prefer a more deliberative process of move-
2
ment and evaluation."
Superintendent of Schools, Bernard Donovan, argued
that the community school districts covering the ghetto
areas would experience difficulties in obtaining qualified
personnel if teachers and supervisors were free to shop
around. A fragmented network of local schools would hurt
the very children who needed the help the most, those
living in the ghettoes.
On the other hand, the Bundy Report was warmly re
ceived by the State Board of Regents which favored the
proposals and, if anything, would have preferred an even
Excerpts from Board Statement on Proposals for Schools,
The New York Times, November 10, 1967, p. 40.
2Leonard Buder, "Giardino Warns of Danger in Plan For
School Reform," The'New York Times, November 9, 1967, p. 1.
■^Leonard Buder, "Board Sees Chaos if Schools Adopt
Bundy Proposals," The New York Times, November 10, 1967, p.l.
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more sweeping reorganization. The New York Times also
gave strong editorial support to the Bundy proposals:
In a report whose broad principles we strongly
endorse, the Bundy Panel on decentralization of the
city school system calls for an almost total shift
of administrative power from the central board of
education to largely independent community school
boards. If this proposal is radical, it is justified
by the fact that the situation is desperate. If the
cure is drastic, it is necessary because a long
succession of moderate reform efforts has failed to
halt the deterioration of New York City's gigantic
school system.^
The Bundy proposals received support from the New
York Association of Negro School Supervisors and Administra
tors despite the fact that many of its members were also
members of the Council of Supervisory Association, which
had so strongly opposed it.3 Additional support was received
from the Puerto Rican Education Association, representing
250 Puerto Rican teachers in the city school system. But
Herman Badillo, Congressman from the Bronx and frequently
a spokesman from the Puerto Rican community, attacked the
Bundy proposals. Mr. Badillo contended that the election
*Fred M.Hechinger, "Regents Propose Sweeping Reform of
Urban Schools," The New York Times, November 20, 1967, p. 1.
2lThe Bundy Report," editorial, The New York Times,
November 9, 1967, p. 46.
3Leonard Buder, "Negro Officials Back Bundy Plan,"
The New York Times, November 14, 1967, p. 41.
. A. Farber, "Community Talks Called by Mayor on
School Reform," The New York Times, November 13, 1967, p. 1.
-40-
of local neighborhood boards would create strife because,
in many areas, candidates would be running along ethnic
lines.1
In January 1968, Mayor Lindsay submitted a revised
plan for reorganizing the schools to the State Legislature,
and in March 1968, the State Board of Regents submitted a
plan of its own. By the end of March, there were, in
addition to the Bundy Plan, no fewer than five different
proposals or modifications of proposals for reorganizing
the city's schools before the State Legislature: The
United Federation of Teachers (U.F.T.) plan, the Lindsay
plan, the Council of Supervisory Associations (C.S.A.) plan,
the Board of Education plan, and the Board of Regents plan.
The U.F.T. Plan
In proposing alternatives to the Bundy recommenda
tions, the U.F.T. had two major objectives: the first was
to keep power out of the hands of militant community control
groups, and the second was to protect the gains that had
been achieved contractually and by private understandings
with the central Board of Education. The U.F.T. recommenda
tions, that were designed to limit community control, fell
into two categories. In the first category were recommenda
tions on the size and number of school districts. In the
"'"Leonard Buder, "Giardino Warns of Danger in Plan for
School Reform," The New York Times, November 14, 1967, p. 1.
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second category were recommendations dealing with the
composition and method of selecting community school
boards and the central Board of Education.
The size and number of community school districts has
an important bearing on the whole concept of community
control, the larger the number of districts and the smaller
the size of each district, the stronger the sense of
community and the influence of community groups. The ten
dency toward residential clustering by race, religion,
class, and ethnicity is very strong. People want to live
among neighbors whose life styles and patterns are similar
to their own. The poor, however, tend to move in a much
smaller radius than do the more affluent. The larger the
district, therefore, the greater the chance that it will
include not one but several communities, each with its
own objectives and life style. As a result, the influence
of each community is diluted in a large district. That is
particularly true in areas populated by the poor of many
different ethnic, cultural, and national backgrounds. It
was with a view toward preserving the integrity of the
community that the Bundy Report recommended that there be
between thirty and sixty districts. It was to dilute the
influence of the community and the U.F.T. recommended that
■'•Alan Altschuler, Community Control, (Indianapolis:
Pegasus Press, 1970), p. 129.
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the number of districts be limited to no more than fifteen.
The U.F.T. proposed that all members of the community
school board should be popularly elected but that the voting
should be limited to parents. This restriction was aimed
directly at community action groups, who provide much of
the militant leadership in black and Puerto Rican communities,
The constituencies of these groups are not limited to
parents, so their influence would be seriously affected by
such a restriction.
The U.F.T. recommended that the members of the central
Board of Education be appointed by the Mayor from lists pro
posed by the community school boards. Such a procedure
would enable the U.F.T. to exert its considerable influence
at two levels, the district level and the mayoralty level.
In addition to recommendations concerned with the size
of districts and the selection of board members, the U.F.T.
offered a number of proposals designed to protect the rights
and privileges of teachers. One such proposal was that the
central Board continue to control that portion of the budget
applicable to salaries, pensions, and other legal contractual
obligations. Another was that tenure be granted on a city-
wide basis and not be limited to a particular school district.
A third was that the assignment of teachers be handled by
the central Board in accordance with rank on the basis of a
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national examination.
This last proposal touches on a critical issue that
had been raised by the Bundy Report, the elimination of
the influential Board of Examiners. This Board, through
its control of selection and testing procedures for teachers
and supervisors, controlled entry to and promotion within
the school system. The Bundy Report had recommended that
the community school boards be given authority to determine
the eligibility of teaching personnel, subject to State
requirements. The Report had further recommended that the
community boards be empowered to select and assign all
teaching personnel.
At first, the U.F.T. did not oppose the elimination
of the Board of Examiners per se, provided that central
control was maintained in the manner prescribed earlier.
Later, however, the position of the U.F.T. shifted to one
of qualified endorsement of the Bundy Report's recommenda
tion to eliminate the Board of Examiners, a position the
U.F.T. continued to maintain as the possibility and the im
plications of community control became more threatening.
lMComparison of Various Decentralization Programs,"
The New York Times, March 20, 1968, p. 20.
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The Lindsay Plan
Although the proposals made by Mayor John V. Lindsay
were similar to those of the Bundy Report in most respects,
they did reflect a number of concessions to the U.F.T.,
the C.S.A., and the other groups who felt that the Bundy
Report wanted to transfer too much power from the central
Board to the community school boards. Under the Lindsay
plan, for example, the central Board of Education retained
responsibility for operation of the academic high schools
(not just the specialized and vocational high schools) for
an initial three-year period. This was a concession to the
powerful high school division of the Board of Education,
about whom it said: "There is the New York City school system,
and then there is the the high school division." The
Lindsay plan also recommended that the number of school dis
tricts be kept to thirty. Although this was double the
number of the U.F.T. had proposed, nevertheless it was the
minimum number the Bundy Report had proposed, in effect,
another compromise.
Under the Lindsay plan, the community boards were
empowered to select and assign personnel, but the central
Board would determine the eligibility of the teaching staff
through qualifying examinations. In a similar vein the
^David Rogers, 110 Livingston Street (New York: Random
House, 1968) p. 301.
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Lindsay plan gave the central Board the power to ensure
maintenance of State standards and to intervene if it
found that established norms were being violated by
the local boards.
The Lindsay modifications of the Bundy proposals
were clearly designed to temper some of the provisions that
had provoked the most concern on the part of teachers and
supervisors and, at the same time, retain the spirit of the
decentralization and community control concepts embodied
in the Bundy Report. The response of U.F.T. president
Albert Shanker to these modificaitions was a prediction
that Mayor Lindsay would recommend even more changes because
"he realizes that whatever is passed by the State Legislature
will be called the Lindsay plan."
The Board of Education Plan
Although the U.F.T. may have been the most belligerent
opponent of the Bundy proposals, it was not the most intransi
gent. This dubious distinction was shared by the Council
of Supervisory Associations (C.S.A.) and the central Board
of Education. Both of these groups took the position
that educational performance was not a function of a structure
but of process and this process must be controlled by pro
fessionals. Although the U.F.T. was prepared to accept
^•"Comparison of Various Decentralization Programs,"
The New York Times, March 20, 1968, p. 20.
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change except in those areas that might affect the se
curity of teachers, the C.S.A. and the central Board were
unwilling to accept any significant changes whatsoever.
The Board of Education recommended that the existing
school districts be retained; that the composition and
method of selecting local school boards be retained; and
that the composition and method of selecting the central
Board of Education be retained. The Board of Education
further proposed that there be no change from the
existing distribution of power, according to which the
central Board was responsible for both educational policy
and the operation of the school system.
Although the Board of Education was willing to allow
the local school board to select the district superintendent,
it recommended that the Board of Examiners continue to
determine the eligibility of all personnel who would then
be assigned by the central Board. The Board would consult
with the local school boards, however, on the assignment of
principals. Tenure would be determined on a citywide basis,
not locally.
Under the Board of Education plan, the board would
control funds for salaries and other mandated purposes, but
would allocate to the local boards a lump sum for maintenance,
repairs, books, and instructional material and equipment.
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Local schoo] boards would be permitted to choose from
among certain programs, and to create new programs from
whatever additional funds were available, subject to the
approval of the central Board, curriculum would be
handled centrally, but the local boards would be permitted
to adopt it to their needs.
Council of Supervisory Associations Plan
The powerful Council of Supervisory Associations is
a professional organization of about 3,000 members whose
primary memberships are in fourteen constituent organiza
tions, including the High School Principals Association,
the Junior High School Principals Association, and the
New York Elementary School Principals Association. The
C.S.A. rejected even the few minor changes that the Board
of Education was willing to accept.
The C.S.A. proposed that the City Superintendent con
tinue to select the district Superintendent after consulta
tion with the local Board. The Board of Examiners would
select personnel, and the central board would assign
them after some consultation with the local boards. Tenure
would be on a citywide basis.
The C.S.A. also recommended that the central Board
lnComparison of Various Decentralization Programs,
The New York Times, March 20, 1968, p. 20.
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continue to manage funds for such purposes as salaries,
pensions, and major aspects of construction and repair.
The local school boards would have funds for building
maintenance and repairs, for educational services and for
the purchase of textbooks and supplies.
The Board of Regents Plan
Although the proposals of the State Board of Regents
supported the recommendations of the Bundy Report in most
respects, they did deviate from those of the Report on a
number of matters. Most significant was the Regents'
recommendation that the number of school districts be re
duced to fifteen. Although this proposal was the same as
the one made by the U.F.T., the motivation was quite differ
ent, the Regents still placed high priority on school
desegregation despite the setbacks that the cause of
integration had received in the past. They hoped that, by
having larger districts that would include children of many
different racial and ethnic backgrounds, the progress of
integration would be accelerated. However, the Regents did
not reject the concept of community and the advantages of
a smaller district altogether. They also proposed that
there be a number of smaller districts in areas of low
educational achievement with jurisdiction over elementary
and intermediate schools. These districts, however, would
be only temporary.
-49-
In other respects the proposals of the Regents were
very much in accord with those of the Bundy Report. The
Regents proposed that the District Superintendent be
appointed by the local school board under contract, and
that all other personnel be engaged by the local board on
the recommendation of the district Superintendent. The
minimum qualification for the appointment of all personnel
would be State certification as opposed to certification
by the New York Baord of Examiners. Tenure of all incumbent
personnel, however, would be protected.
The Board of Regents proposed that the central Board
of Education comprise five members selected by the Mayor
from a list submitted by a screening committee of civic
and educational leaders. This recommendation differed from
the Bundy Report recommendation in that the latter had
proposed a nine-member board, five of whose members would
be selected from names submitted by the presidents of the
community school boards; the remaining four would be selected
as proposed by the Regents.
The Regents also proposed that the local school boards
comprise eleven members, who would be elected by all the
eligible voters in the district (not just parents, as pro
posed by the U.F.T.). This proposal also differed from that
of the Bundy Report, which had recommended that the local
school boards comprise six members selected by a panel
elected by parents and five members selected by the Mayor.
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The Board of Regents further proposed that the local
school boards have maximum control over their budgets, and
that they be encouraged to experiment with educational
practices and procedures. The central Board would have
authority to deal with citywide aspects of education, and
to maintain State and City standards.
These six proposals presented to the State Legislature
in the Spring of 1968, reflected a broad spectrum of
attitudes about decentralization and community control, from
the C.S.A. plan with its uncompromising rejection of change
on the one hand, to the Bundy Report with its strong orien
tation toward community control on the other. Ultimately,
aspects of almost all of these proposals found their way
into the 1969 decentralization law.
The Attitude of the Community
A significant factor during this critical period was
the absence of strong community support for the Bundy proposals,
particularly from the black communities that were supposed
to be the principal beneficiaries of these proposals. Mario
Fantini, who headed the staff that prepared the Bundy
Report and a strong advocate of community control, acknow
ledges this lack of community support:
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The Bundy Plan itself was viewed with almost
as much suspicion by the community control advocates
as it was by the majority of teachers and supervisors.
Disbelief that a progressive equitable blueprint
could emanate from the establishment tended to dilute
any wholehearted support the plan may have had from
the strongest community leaders.1
Fantini points out that although these attitudes may have
been justified on the basis of long and better experience,
they were self-defeating from the very first round of the
community control struggle.
The Marchi Law
By the time the various community control proposals
reached the State Legislature in May 1968, it was evident
that, although some moderate form of decentralization might
be acceptable, the legislators were going to proceed with
caution. Moderation and caution were certainly the dominant
characteristics of two proposals drafted by State Senator
John J. Marchi, Republican from Staten Island and Chairman
of the Senate Committee on New York City. The .First of
these two proposals called upon the existing Board of
Education to produce a decentralization plan by July 1, 1969,
The Board would then hold hearings on the plan and submit
recommendations to the 1970 session of the State Legislature,
l-Mario Fantini, Marilyn Gittell and Richard Magat,
Community Control and the Urban School (New York:
Praeger, 1970), p. 237.
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The second >krehi proposal made provisions for the
interim period during which the Board of Education
would be drawing up a decentralization plan. The thirty
existing local boards would be given the power to hire
superintendents for their districts. They would also
be permitted to conduct special urban educational projects
for the disadvantaged with the approval of the central
Board. Fiscal power and the responsibility for hiring
and firing teachers, granting tenure and contract negotia
tion would be controlled by the central Board.
A number of legislators wanted a stronger decentra
lization law, but any and all attempts to achieve a
stronger law were bitterly opposed by the opponents of
decentralization, foremost among whom was the United
Federation of Teachers. Albert Shanker was accused of
threatening to spend union funds to defeat legislators who
voted against the union position.2 That this was no
idle threat is indicated by the fact that Shanker himself
estimated that his union spent between $125,000 and $250,000
in its campaign to defeat decentralization of the City's
3
schools. Another union official, Keith Brand, an opponent
Sydney H. Schonberg, "Albany Stalls on School Change,"
The New York Times, May 3, 1968, p. 50.
2
Sydney H. Schonbert, "Teachers Union Reportedly Blocking
Mild School Decentralization Plan," The New York Times, May 24,
1968, p. 35.
3
"Shanker to Urge Teachers to Return," The New York Times,
May 27, 1968, p. 1.
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of Shanker for the U.F.T. presidency, placed the figure
at $500,000.1
There are indications that this unrelenting pressure
may have reached a point where it was becoming counter
productive. One legislative leader warned Shanker that
he was playing with dynamite, and that if he did not drop
or modify his demands, the legislators might very well
decide to scrap the mild decentralization plan and adopt
a more sweeping one.^ This warning succeeded because
shortly after it was issued, the Legislature finally
passed a somewhat stronger version of the earlier measures
that had been proposed by Senator Marchi. The Marchi Law
as it has come to be called, included the following provi
sions: 1) The Board of Education was enlarged from nine
members to thirteen; 2) The enlarged Board would be
responsible for preparing a detailed decentralization plan
for presentation to the State Board of Regents and to the
State Legislature; 3) During the interim period while the
Board was preparing a permanent plan, it was authorized,
with the approval of the State Board of Regents, to delegate
any of its powers to the thirty existing local school
lnShanker is Accused," The New York Times, May 24, 1969,
p. 35.
2
Sydney H. Schonberg, "Teachers Union Reportedly
Blocking Mild School Decentralization Plan," The New York
Times, May 24, 1968, p. 35.
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boards, and to the three experimental districts, I. S. 201,
Two Bridges and Ocean Hill-Brownsville.
Although-, the Marchi Law had the effect of delaying
any final action on decentralization, it did make two
important contributions to the progress of decentralization.
By expanding the membership on the Board of Education from
nine to thirteen members, it gave Mayor Lindsay the oppor
tunity to appoint four new members to the Board who pre
sumably, would be less hostile to the concept of decentrali
zation. By granting the Board of Education authority to
delegate its authority to the local school boards, the Legis
lature removed an important legal obstacle to decentraliza
tion.
In signing the Marchi Bill, Governor Rockefeller
commented: "While the bill may not be satisfactory to
all persons concerned, it sets a framework for proper
action before the end of the 1968-1969 school year."2 One
of those to whom the March Law was definitely not satisfac
tory was Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, psychologist and the only
Black ever to have served on the State Board of Regents.
Dr. Clark accused Albert Shanker of having used political
Sydney H. Scholberg, "New School Plan Puts Albany
Near '68 Adjournment," The New York Times, May 25, 1968, p.l,
2|IRockefeller Signs City School Bill," The New York
Times, June 13, 1968, p. 1.
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threats, and arrogance "to persuade the Legislature to
pass a bill that sacrifices the interests of children in
deprived areas to the interests of the U.F.T. and the
Board of Education."
The 1969 Decentralization Law
By the time the Marchi Bill was signed into law,
the seeds of conflict had already been planted in the
Ocean Hill-Brownsville demonstration district. This con
flict, which was to erupt in the Fall of 1968, was highlighted
by the longest and most disruptive teacher's strike in the
city's history. It brought into the open submerged feelings
of racism and anti-Semitism whose intensity was probably
not even suspected by the participants. It was against this
background that the Board of Education struggled during the
Fall and Winter of 1968 to produce a decentralization plan
that could be presented to the Legislature in the Spring
of 1969.
By the end of January, 1969, the Board of Education
was ready with its proposals. These included: 1) the
local districts would be governed by locally-elected com
munity school boards. These boards would select their own
1Sydney H. Schonberg, "Veto School Plan Rockefeller
Urged," The New York Times, May 28, 1968, p. 19.
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community superintendent and would have substantial
operating authority over the elementary and junior high
schools in their districts. All high schools (except
those on Staten Island) would remain under the juris
diction of the central Board; 2) the local school boards
would inherit the present school staffs in their districts,
but they would be permitted to recruit and hire additional
teachers and other personnel as needed. They could set
educational policy, control school repairs and maintenance
funds, and purchase supplies; 3) the local boards could
transfer teachers within the district, but no teacher could
be transferred out of the district involuntarily. Tenured
teachers would continue to be protected against dismissal;
4) the central Board would enforce citywide standards,
oversee specialized programs and provide certain services;
5) the city Board of Examiners would be abolished and
State certification would become the requirement for the
employment of teachers; 6) Community school districts
would be permitted to create one new demonstration projection
within each district with the approval of the City Board.
^Leonard Buder, "New Plan Drawn By School Board for
30 Districts," The New York Times, December 15, 1968, p. 1;
Leonard Buder, "Board Publishes City School Plan for 30
Districts," The New York Times, January 29, 1969, p. 1
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tihen the State Board of Regents received the decentra
lization plan that had been proposed by the city Board, the
Regents proceeded to make some sweeping changes of their
own. Taking the position that the very essence of the
community school concept was the transfer of the tradition
al responsibilities of the central Board to the community
boards, the Regents proposed that the existing thirteen
members unsalaried central Board be eliminated entirely.
Those responsibilities that had not been transferred
to the community boards could be discharged more effectively,
according to the Regents, by either an individual or by a
board of three to five members all of whom would be compen
sated. Appointment would be made by the Mayor with the
consent of the City Council.
The Regent's proposals departed from those of the
city Board in several additional ways: 1) The Regents
proposed that the local school boards be permitted to
use money allocated to them in a lump sum without prior
approval of a detailed budget as was proposed by the
City Board;2 2)The City Board had proposed that the community
school boards have the power to determine curriculum in
their schools in accordance with State laws and the regula
tions of the Commissioner of Education, subject to the City
Barnes F. Clarity "Regents Propose Major Revision in
School Plan," The New York Times, March 4, 1969, p. 1.
2Ibid.
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Board's power to set ci^ywide minimum curriculum require
ments. The Regents amended this proposal by deleting the
City Board's authority to set citywide standards; 3) The
City Board had proposed that existing laws be modified to
permit a school district employee to be a candidate for
community school board membership in any district other
than the one in which he was employed. The Regents pro
posed that no employee of the New York City school system
should be eligible for election to a community school
o
board.
U.F.T. President Albert Shanker labeled both proposals
an educational disaster, and warned that about half of the
city's 58,000 teachers would quit the public school system
if these plans were approved by the State Legislature.-3
With memories of the teacher's strike of 1968 still very
fresh in their minds, the legislators were hardly in the
mood for another confrontation.
The decentralization-community control issue was
hotly contested in the Legislature over a period of several
weeks. The black caucus, whose major spokesman were Basil
Patterson and Charles Rangel, led the fight for a strong
decentralization law, but were outvoted on practically every
2Ibid.
3"Shanker Fearful of resignations," The New York Times, March 16,
1969, p. 76.
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major point. The decentralization law that finally
emerged on April 30, 1969 satisfied few of the supporters
of decentralization and not even all of its opponents.
The method it provided for the selection of central
Board members was later declared unconstitutional.
Some of its provisions, particularly those defining the
powers of the central Board, were so vague that they
invited confusion and conflict.
All in all, the provisions of the Decentralization
Law bore little resemblance to the proposals made by the
Bundy Committee, a committee that had been mandated by
the State Legislature for the express purpose of making
recommendations that would provide the basis for decentra
lization legislation. A comparison of the recommendations
of the Bundy Report and the provisions of the Decentraliza
tion Law discloses how far the State Legislature had de
parted from the spirit of the Bundy Report, the spirit of
decentralization.
Selection of Central Board of Education Members
Consistent with its objective of increasing community
participation in the school system, the Bundy Report had
recommended that five members of a nine-member central Board
1State of New York Senate Bill 5690 and Assembly Bill
7175.
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of Education be selected by the Mayor. The remaining
five members would be elected by the voters of each
borough, one board member for each borough. This
meant that the borough of Richmond with one school district
(district thirty-one) and only 48,401 pupils (86.9 percent
of whom are white) and the borough of Brooklyn, encompassing
ten school districts (districts thirteen to twenty-two
inclusive) and serving 414,892 pupils (61.7 percent of
whom are black and Puerto Rican) would each have one Board
member representing them. This method of election was so
patently unrepresentative that it was declared in violation
of the "one man, one vote" rule by a Federal court.
Selection of Community School Board Members
The Bundy Report had proposed that the community school
boards comprise eleven members each. Six members would be
selected by district panels elected by parents of children
who attended schools in the district. The remaining five
members would be selected by the Mayor (after consultation
with parents and community organizations) from lists of
qualified persons that would be presented by the central
Board. The Bundy Panel considered and rejected the direct
•'■Article 52A section 2590-b of the State Education
Act as amended April 30, 1969.
2Facts and Figures 1969-1970 (City School District
of New York, Brooklyn, New York, March 1, 1970), p. 58; also
"Annual Census of School Population - October 30, 1970,"
The New York Times, June 18, 1971, p. 43.
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election of community school board members. This decision
was motivated by the fear of possible domination of the
community boards by residents who were not parents and
by sectarian groups. The decentralization law provided
for the direct election of community school boards by
all residents of the community under a system of propor
tional representation, thereby opening the door to the
2
very abuses the Bundy Panel had tried to avoid.
Responsibility for Curriculum
The Bundy Report had recommended that the community
school boards have the responsibility for the general course
of study given in the schools. This course of study would
have to comply with the standards established by the State
Board of Regents and the Commissioner of Education. The
central Board would be responsible for reviewing the educa
tion provided in the schools under the jurisdiction of the
community school boards. The results of this review and
any recommendations for action in case of violations of
State educational standards would be reported to the State
Commissioner of Education.-^ The Decentralization Law,
however, assigned the responsibility for setting minimum
education standards and curriculum requirements for all
■"■Bundy Report, pp. 18-19.
2Article 52A, section 2590-c.
3
Bundy Report, p. 79.
-62-
schools and programs to the Chancellor (the new title
for the Superintendent). Each Community School Board is
required to make an annual report to the Chancellor
covering all matters relating to the schools under its
jurisdiction. This report should include an evaluation
of the educational effectiveness of these schools and
their programs.1 If, in the judgment of the Chancellor,
a Community School Board fails to comply with the provi
sions of the law, the Chancellor can suspend or remove
the offending Community Board or any member of it.
Selection and Appointment of School Personnel
A major recommendation of the Bundy Report had
been to eliminate the Board of Examiners and to replace
the highly centralized and restrictive entry and promotion
policies of the existing system with more liberal
policies. To give districts the largest possible pool
from which to choose, the Report proposed that selection
be limited only by the requirement that teachers meet
State certification standards and that appointments be com
petitive. The Bundy Report also proposed that the community
school districts be free to petition the State Commissioner
•'"Article 52A, section 2590-h, paragraphs 8, 9 and 10.
2Article 52A, section 2590-i.
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of Education for alternative means of certifying teachers.
These would include the use of certain approved college
and university programs with internship provisions, the
National Teachers Examination, and teaching experience
in the Peace Corps or V.I.S.T.A. Teachers and non-
supervisory personnel would be hired by the community
school board on recommendation of the community superin
tendent and his staff.
The Bundy Report had proposed that eligibility for
supervisory positions be governed by State standards or
by alternative standards developed in the district and
approved by the State Education Commissioner. It also
had recommended that the ranking of candidates be
abandoned for all positions; that the basis of examination
for supervisory positions be enlarged to give emphasis to
performance as opposed to pencil-and-paper tests; and that
consideration be given to applicants in other school dis
tricts inside and outside the city as well as to those
already in the district.
Under the provisions of the Decentralization Law,
the Board of Examiners was retained and given the power to
prepare and administer examinations to determine the fitness
of all candidates for teaching and supervisory positions
1Bundy Report, pp. 48-49.
2Ibid., p. 51.
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other than the positions of Chancellor, Executive
Deputy City Superintendent, Deputy City Superintendent,
Assistant City Superintendent and Community Superintendent .*■
The Decentralization Law required each Community
School Board to appoint teachers for all schools and
programs under its jurisdiction who are assigned to the
district by the Chancellor from competitive eligible
lists. Insofar as was possible, the Chancellor was
supposed to honor requests by the Community Boards for
specific persons when making such assignments. A special
provision was made for schools in which the reading scores
of the pupils were in the lower forty-five percent of all
schools. Before October 1 of each year, every school has
to be ranked in order of percentage of pupils who are
reading at grade level as determined by a comprehensive
reading examination prepared and administered under the
auspices of the Chancellor. If the ranking of a school
falls in the lower forty-five percent of all schools, the
Community School Board having jurisdiction over that
school, may appoint any person to teach in the school
without regard to any competitive eligibility list, pro
vided he has the education and experience for certification
as a teacher, and provided he passes a qualifying examina
tion prepared and administered by the Board of Examiners
or passes the National Teachers Examination with the average
•'•Article 52A, section 2590-j , paragraph 3 (a) (1) .
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pass mark established over a five-year period.
Jurisdiction Over High Schools
The Bundy Report proposed that high schools be under
the jurisdiction of the Community school boards and that
only the city's five special high schools and twenty-nine
vocational schools should continue to be operated by the
central Board of Education.^ Under the provisions of the
Decentralization Law, however, the power to control and
operate all academic and vocational high schools was
given to the chancellor until thse schools would be
transferred to the jurisdiction of the Community school
Boards.J
Compensation of Community School Board Members
The Bundy Report recommended that members of
Community School Boards receive compensation for expenses
they incurred, including lost wages for time spent in
attending school meetings. The Report also recommended
that Community School Board members be compensated for
expenses incurred including lost wages, while engaged in
activities other than meetings that the Community Board
might impose on its members. This recommendation was
Article 52A, section 2590-j, paragraph 4(c), 5(a), 5(b)
2Bundy Report, p. 23.
3Article 52A, section 2590-h, paragraph 1.
^"Bundy Report, p. 78.
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ignored by the Legislature, but the Decentralization Law
did provide for compensation for the members of the
central Board of Education, although this had not even
been mentioned in the Bundy Report.
Summary and Analysis
The direction of the Bundy proposals, the Regents
proposals, the Lindsay proposals, and the proposals of the
revised central Board of Education had been toward greater
autonomy for the local community. The decentralization law
that was finally enacted, however, emphasized the admini
strative aspects of decentralization while it carefully
hedged whatever powers it granted to the community with
tight safeguards and constraints. The method of selecting
members of the central Board of Education would have led
to maximum dilution of the votes of minority group community
members. This provision was so unrepresentative that it
was invalidated by the courts. The method of selecting
Community School Board members, although not illegal, con
tributed, at least in part, to the serious underrepresenta-
tion of blacks and Puerto Ricans on Community school boards.
Although 57.27, of the city's public schools enrollment was
Article 52A, section 2590-b. Amount set by New York
City Council at $100 per day.
-67-
black or Puerto Rican, only sixteen to seventeen percent
of the 279 members elected to Community School Boards
throughout the city were black and only ten to eleven
percent were Puerto Rican.
The provisions of the Decentralization Law on
compensation (or lack of compensation) for Community
School Board members was significantly related to the
composition of the Community School Boards. Sixty-three
point eight percent of all Board members hold professional,
technical or managerial positions; 10.37o are employed by
poverty agencies or as paraprofessionals; 5.37O are clergymen;
16.67o are hosewives; 47O are employed as laborers or
mechanics, or in relatively low-paying unskilled or semi-
skilled jobs. The demands on Community Board members' time
are so great that in poverty areas, where the working
members of the population are engaged in occupations from
which they cannot take time off, a large proportion of the
community is automatically excluded from Community School
Board membership. This applies to the housewives as well.
It is very difficulty for wives and mothers in poverty areas
to cope with the demands of a household and of rearing
small children while serving on a community Board without
•1-Boulton H. Demas, The School Election: A Critique of
the 1969 New York City School Decentralization (New York:
Institute for Community Studies, 1971), p. 5^
2Ibid.
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some form of compensation to pay for baby sitters and
household help. *
The one member of the professional staff over whom
the Community School Board has complete jurisdiction is
the community Superintendent. All other members of the
supervisory and teaching staff are subject to the
jurisdiction of the Community Board but only within the
constraints imposed by union contracts and the provisions
of the Decentralization Law.
Recruitment of new teachers and supervisors is
restricted by provisions very similar to those that existed
prior to decentralization. The Board of Examiners has
been retained with most of its powers intact.
Despite the various constraints that were imposed on
the Community School Boards vis-a-vis the allocation of
funds, the selection of staff and the choice of curriculum,
the Decentralization Law did provide for some dilution of
authority from headquarters to local school boards.
First and foremost, it gave recognition to the fact
that the local community has a role to play in the conduct
of its schools, and that this role is not merely a passive
one. Secondly, the concept of accountability of the pro
fessional staff for their performance, as well as the con
cept of the accountability of the Community Board for theirs,
1
Since July 1972, Board members have received an expense
n(>p of $50.00 a month, and the — * * "~
a month.
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is implicit in the Decentralization Law. Finally, there
is recognition of the diversity of the school population
and the variety of its needs with respect to school
programs and curriculum. The question, however, is whether
or not the Decentralization Law is an adequate vehicle
to accomplish those objectives that proponents of decentra
lization and community control contend would lead to
increased school effectiveness.
CHAPTER III
COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT SEVEN AND THE
EFFECTS OF DECENTRALIZATION
Community District Seven in the South Bronx of
New York City was selected for this study because it has
many of the problems you have in the city, (i.e., unemploy
ment, drug addiction and deteriorated housing). It was
the failure of the centralized school system to provide
pupils from poverty areas such as this with basic learning
skills that, to a large extent, provoked the demand for
decentralization and community control. It is only fitting,
therefore, that the impact of the Decentralization Law and
the concept of community control should be examined here.
Moreover, because of the relationship between education and
upwards mobility, it is in districts such as this that de
centralization must prove its effectiveness as an instrument
for change.
District Seven, comprising most of the South Bronx,
has a population of approximately 200,000 people. About
65% of the population is Puerto Rican; about 35% are black,
and the balance non-Puerto Rican whites. These proportions
-70-
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are closely reflected in the composition of the student
population as shown in Table 1.
With a school population that is ninety percent
black or Puerto Rican, District Seven has a far higher
concentration of these two ethnic groups than does
the Bronx as a whole. In the Bronx, about 74% of the
student body is either black or Puerto Rican; in Manhattan
about 73%; in Brooklyn, about 62%; in Queens, about 32%;
and in Richmond (Staten Island) about 12%. A further
distinctive demographic feature of District seven is the
fact that, although the student population of the Bronx
as a whole is black and 39.7% Puerto Rican, in District
seven the Puerto Ricans outnumber the blacks two to one.
The number of students now under the jurisdiction
of Community District seven is approximately 30,000. In
the fall of 1968, prior to decentralization, there were
35,000 students including those attending two vocational
high schools and one "six hundred" school. At that time,
the district included nineteen elementary schools and four
intermediate schools in addition to the two high schools
and the "six hundred" school.
Schools numbered in the "600" series are designated










































































































































































Source: Ethnic Census as of October 31, 1970, District Circular Letter #33,
1970-1971, May 6, 1971,
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Under the provisions of the Decentralization Law, the
two high schools and the "six hundred" school were reassigned
to the jurisdiction of Community District eight. This reduced
the number of schools under the jurisdiction of Community
District seven from twenty-six to twenty-two. The present student
population of Intermediate School thirty-eight has been trans
ferred to two new intermediate schools, Intermediate School 151
and Intermediate School 162 and Intermediate School thirty-
eight has been abandoned. In addition, another elementary
school, P. S. 156, has been completed. This brings the total
number of schools in District Seven to twenty-four.
The area in which District Seven is located has been
described as one of the most severely impacted poverty areas
not just in New York City, but in the entire nation. Forty
percent of the families have incomes under $4,000. Its problems
include unemployment, drug addiction, unwed teenage mothers,
infant mortality, veneral disease, truancy and school dropouts.
Housing has steadily deteriorated. There has been no private
construction of housing in the past fifty years. The only
new housing has been provided by eleven public housing projects
that have been built in the area.1
Bernard Friedman, "The Strike-District Seven Style "
Crisis Response. (New York: Center for Urban Education '
December, 1969), pp. 50-51.
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The Effects of Decentralization
The indicators that were selected to measure change
in school effectiveness since decentralization were reading
scores, student absenteeism and student suspensions.
Reading Scores
Citywide standardized achievement tests in reading
have been administered for many years in all schools in the
second through ninth grades. When the Decentralization Law
was enacted, one of its provisions required the Chancellor
to hold these comprehensive reading examinations annually
during April or May. Then, prior to October 1, each school
is ranked in order of the percentage of pupils reading above
grade level. This procedure not only serves as a check on
pupil performance in the schools, but also has an important
bearing on the selection of teachers. If the ranking of a
school under the jurisdiction of a community district falls in
the lower forty-five percent, the Community Board can appoint
any person as a teacher in that school without regard to any
competitive eligibility. The only requirements are that he
has the education and experience qualifications for certifica
tion as a teacher, and either passes a qualifying examination
prepared by the Board of Examiners or has passed the National
Teachers Examination within the past four years. Reading
1State of New York Senate Bill 5690 and Assembly Bill
7175, Article 52A, section 2590-j; paragraph 5 (a).
2Ibid., Article 52A, section 2590-j, paragraph 5(a), (b),
and (c).
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scores for fifth grade students in the schools in District
Seven from 1965 to 1972 appear in Table 2.
Test scores are given in grade equivalent units. The
number of correct answers that the pupil achieves is converted
to a grade equivalent score on the basis of tables developed
when the test was standardized on a national sample of students.
In formulating the standardized scoring system, the ten months
of the school year are represented by tenths of the grade
equivalent score. A score of 5.7 therefore, would be the
grade equivalent score for a test given in March, the seventh
month of one year's reading instruction.
The grade equivalent scores for District Seven have
fallen well below the City average regularly. In most years
since 1965, the disparity has been a year or more. In 1971,
this disparity was reduced to eight months, not because the
reading scores in District Seven had improved, but because the
citywide average had fallen to its lowest point in six years.
In 1972, however, the gap widened once again to a year.
These scores tell us very little about the effects of
decentralization. They do, however, reinforce the very strong
belief that the schools are failing in one of their fundamental
functions and that decentralized school districts must seek more
innovative approaches geared to individual needs. For example,
^-Summary of Research, Citywide Reading Test Results for
1969-1970, Bureau of Educational Research, City School District
of the City of New York, December 1970, p. 1.
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the performance of students at P. S. 31 have been consistently
higher than the district average or the city average. The
reason is that P. S. 31 initiated a Special Primary program
funded under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act, which was designed to raise the academic level
of children from minority groups. Reading instruction has
been conducted in small departmentalized groups and a special
effort has been made to detect and correct learning disabilities
early through individual attention.
In releasing the citywide test results for 1969-70,
Harvey B. Scribner, Chancellor of the Board of Education of
the city of New York schools, pointed out that judgments based
solely on test scores are often unfair and unproductive. In
the first place, a school whose test results, as a group,
indicate an academic "failure" may actually be a "success" in
the sense that its students may have made important progress,
although their absolute academic level may be below that of
other schools. In the second place, the school experience
includes such intangibles as maturity, emotional and psychologi
cal growth, and the development of values and attitudes.
Chancellor Scribner concluded his statement by saying:
It is simplistic and too easy to blame academic failure
on the learner, on his lack of interest, his family
background or his economical level. When a student
fails to learn, it is more accurate to say that the
learning process has been ineffective, and the school
must seek, perhaps with new methods and new resources,
to bring to that process and that student a new level
of academic success. ■*■
1Ibid., p. iv.
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This concept had the strong support of the Community
School Board and the community action groups in District Seven.
As a result, although decentralization has had no visible effect
on reading scores for pupils of District Seven, the Decentrali
zation Law incorporates provisions that give these test
scores some important implications for teachers. The first
of these is that the Board can bypass the eligibility lists in
its selection of teachers if the school ranks in the lower
forty-five percent of test scores. The second of these gives
the Community School Board the power to grant tenure or to
withhold it. These provisions are particularly relevant in
District Seven where sixty percent of the pupils are Puerto
Rican and where the demand for an increase in the number of
Spanish-speaking teachers ("who are more responsive to the
needs of Spanish-speaking children") has become more and more
insistent.
This demand posed a threat to white teachers in District
Seven, and in some instances, the black teachers as well. Not
surprisingly, the teachers used various methods to try to keep
the reading scores at or above level. For example, if the
reading test scores for the individual schools in District
Seven are examined year by year, it can be observed that there
are a number of instances of sudden leaps forward, some as much
as a year or more. When asked about these "improvements"
the community superintendent's explanation was to the point:
"They cheat." This cheating takes the form of coaching pupils
TABLE 2
CITYWIDE SURVEY OF READING ABILITY, DISTRICT 7,




















































































































































CITYWIDE SURVEY OF READING ABILITY, DISTRICT 7,



















































































Source: Bureau of Educational Research, Board of Education of the City of New York.
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on materials taken from the actual tests themselves. These
practices were by no means confined to District Seven.
In fact, they were so widespread that Chancellor Scribner
found it necessary to send a letter to all Community School
Boards and community superintendents advising them of their
responsibility, under the Decentralization Law, for actions
performed by school personnel relating to instruction and
evaluation. At the same time, he advised the community
Superintendents and their Boards, of the appointment of a
committee on citywide reading tests to evaluate the current
test and to explore ways to avoid the pressures caused by the
publication of reading scores by schools as required by
law.2
Although no positive conclusions can be drawn at this
time about the effect of decentralization on reading test
scores as a measure of school effectiveness, we can conclude
that the Decentralization Law has shifted the burden of
failure from the pupil to the school system. The results of
this shift are not yet evident, but at least the pressure
to change is now being exerted on the system rather than on
the pupils and their parents.
■'"Leonard Buder, "Actual Tests Used to Prepare Pupils for
Reading Exams," The New York Times, April 3, 1971, p. 1.
2Letter from Harvey B. Scribner, Chancellor, Board of
Education of the City of New York to Community School Superin
tendents and Chairmen of Community School Boards, May 11, 1971,
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Suspensions
In discussing the shortcomings of the New York public
school systems, the Bundy Report called attention to the
fact that some 12,000 students had been suspended during
the previous school year. These suspensions were of two
types: (1) A principal had the power to suspend the students
for up to five days in cases where he felt that the behavior
of the student was disruptive or presented a danger to other
students or staff members. Most of the suspensions were of
this type. (2) If the principal felt that a longer period
of suspension was desirable, he could refer the matter to the
community Superintendent, who would arrange for a hearing.
After the hearing, the student might be transferred to another
school, sent to a "six hundred" school (600 schools are special
schools for maladjusted children), referred to the Bureau of
Child Guidance, or reinstated in his old school. Until he
is reassigned, however, the student can be kept on suspension.
The New York Civil Liberties Union had charged that many
students had been suspended without being given a fair
hearing.1 Ellen Lurie, Educational Director of United Bronx
Parents, contended that "too many principals use suspensions
to harass students, intimidate parents and to get rid of
those pupils they simply do not want to handle." When
^Leonard Buder, "Illegal Suspensions of Public School
Pupils Charged by Civil Liberties Union," The New York Times,
February 19, 1971, p. 74.
2
Ellen Lurie, How to Change the Schools (New York:
Vantage Press, 1971), p. 194.
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Dr. Bernard Friedman became community Superintendent of
District Seven in 1965, one of his first appointments was
a new guidance person to investigate the reasons for so many
suspensions. In the first year after this appointment, sus
pensions dropped from eighty-nine to fifty; in the second
year, from fifty to twenty-five; in the following year, from
twenty-five to eight; and finally suspensions dropped to
zero. (Table 3).
Between 1966 and 1970, this policy at district
headquarters was reflected in a reduction in the number of
principals1 five-day suspensions at the local level. From
362 suspensions in 1966-67, the total dropped to 113 in
1969 - 70. In 1970-71, however, it rose to 163, and
in 1971-72 to 283, the highest point in five years. Three
schools (P. S. 30, J.H.S. 38 and J.H.. 149) accounted for
sixty-five percent of the suspensions in 1970-71. Two
of the same schools (P.S. 30 and J.H.S. 149) plus a third
(J.H.S. 162, a new school to which the students of J.H.S.
had been transferred) accounted for seventy percent of the
suspensions in 1971-1972. (Table 4). Guidance counselors
explained this concentration of suspensions as being related
to the appointment of new principals who felt that they had
to demonstrate control over their particular school.
Student Absenteeism
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TOTALS 362 242 206 113 163 283
a = New Principal
b = Acting Principal
c = New school students transferred from J.H.S. 38, which are closed.
Source: Office of Special Services, Guidance Department, District 7,
Board of Education, City of New York.
-87-
-88-
Community School Board of District Seven as one of its major
difficulties. It follows a pattern that had persisted over
the last several years (Table 5) although it was not peculiar
to District Seven. Figures obtained from the City Controller's
office show that New York City, with an attendance rate of
eighty three precent, leads the country in pupil absences.
Los. Angeles, for example, had an attendance rate of 97.27o
San Francisco, 94.5%; and Washington, D. C. 93%. Most of the
schools in District Seven fell very close to the citywide
average, with approximately half slightly over it and half
slightly under it.
In industry, the relation of absenteeism to job
satisfaction has been investigated by several phsychologists.
Dr. Victor H. Vroom, author of the book, Work and Motivation,
describes several studies that have reported a correlation:
To the extent to which the worker derives satis
faction from participating in his work role, we
would assume that there would be a force acting
on him to be present at work. It would seem to
make little difference what characteristics of the
work role are the source of these rewards. The only
requirement is that the attainment is dependent on
being present at work.2
1Annual Report of Community School Board Seven for
1970-71, Submitted to Chancellor Scribner of The Board of
Education of the City of New York, August 27, 1971.
^Victor H. Vroom, Work and Motivation (New York:
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































If this relationship holds true of pupils and their schools,
it would appear that many of them are finding attendance a far
from satisfying experience.
Like his adult counterpart, the child, also makes
judgements of the school. He may regard it as a waste of time,
or, on the other hand, as an exciting and rewarding experience
that meets his needs. What the pupil's experience will be
depends, at least in part, on his attitude toward school, and
these attitudes, in turn, are determined to a greater or lesser
extent by the attitudes of his parents, the community at large,
and his peers. If parents and neighbors regard the school
as a strange, unresponsive, or ineffective institution, such
an atmosphere contributes to pupil alientation from the
school and to academic failure. If, on the other hand, the
community can identify with the school and can recognize the
agency in which they have an investment, children will also
have positive expectations. It was with such attitudes in
mind that one of the objectives of decentralization was to
provide for greater participation and a more meaningful role
on the part of parents and the community.
Unfortunately, in poverty areas, the causes for ab
senteeism are frequently physical rather than psychological.
In the black and Puerto Rican communities of the South Bronx,
where school absenteeism is the greatest, high family mobility,
Bundy Report, p. 12.
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illness and lack of adequate clothing, particularly during
the winter months, are major contributing factors. These
factors are not likely to respond to decentralization. Under
the circumstances, it is not surprising that there has been
little change in the attendance figures in District Seven
since decentralization. So far as the future is concerned, it
would appear that any large change in pupil attendance would
require not only organizational reform of the school system,
but also sweeping social reform of city services including
more resources and social services for the poor.
Integration of the Local School With
the Local Community
Proponents of decentralization and community control
have attributed at least part of the blame for the failures
of the New York City public school system to the alienation
of the children and their parents from schools with which
they did not identify. For these parents and children, the
schools were institutions controlled by some remote and face
less governmental agency. They perceived the teachers and
supervisors as "outsiders" who did not live in the district,
who entered it reluctantly, and who left it quickly at the
three o'clock bell. In 1971, for example, the federal govern
ment authorized "hazard pay" for teachers in schools located
in slum areas.
1"Hazard"PayAuthorized by U. S. for Teachers in Slum
Schools," The New York Times, October 14, 1971.
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With decentralization and increased community control,
it was felt that there would be greater integration of the
school with the community. This would manifest itself in
a number of ways: (1) Through the Community School Board,
there would be an increased sense of participation on the
part of the community; (2) There would be an increase in the
number of staff members who live in the community and were part
of it; (3) There would be a closer relationship among the
professional staff, the parents and the community at large;
(4) There would be greater use of school facilities by the
community after school hours.
In District Seven, the first and second of these
objectives have been achieved in a limited way. The results
are inconclusive on the third objective and as for the fourth,
the effects of decentralization and community control were
adverse.
Participation by the Community in Decision-Making
There are two aspects of the community's role in
decision - making that must be considered. The first is the
extent to which the sentiments and attitudes of the community
influence the decisions of the Community School Board. The
second, and possibly more significant, aspect is the extent
to which the objectives and actions desired by the community
are within the decision-making power of the Community School
Board. Although the Community School Board is, for the most
part, highly sensitive to the demands of the community, the
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most pressing demands are not within the jurisdiction of
the Community Board.
The influence of the community on decision-making is
exerted through a variety of channels. It is exerted through
the anti-poverty agencies such as the South Bronx Community
Council. The United Bronx Parents has an important influence
on the Community Board. The fact that the members of the
Community School Board also hold memberships in one or more
of these organizations helps to keep them in touch with
large segments of the community.
The Parents Associations in the local schools provide
another direct link between the local community and the
Community School Board. This link has been strengthened by
the assignment of Board members to specific schools.
Although there might have been some issues on which
the community has been divided, there have been few, if any,
instances on which the Board has taken a position with which
the community as a whole (both black and Puerto Rican) has
disagreed. Although this is partly the result of the Board's
sensitivity to the demands of the community, it is also a
reflection of the narrow range of issues within which the
Community Board has the authority to make decisions.
There were forty different resolutions acted upon by
the Community School Board at the open meetings and discussions
during 1970-71. Of these forty resolutions, fourteen were
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confirmations of appointments of staff personnel; six were
concerned with the internal organization of the Board itself
(election of officers, etc.); three dealt with various modi
fications within the budget (shifting funds from one use to
another). The remaining seventeen resolutions dealt with
the following topics: proposals for the District Seven bud
get for the next year, to be submitted to the Chancellor;
free milk and free lunch for all children in District Seven;
the composition of the Advisory Committees for Title I and
State Urban Education Programs; names for three new school;
recommendations for a school site; recommendation for an
early childhood center; proposal for a special curriculum
for over-age students in one Intermediate School; termina
tion of a probationary teacher for excessive absenteeism;
expansion of the playground area for one school; acceptance
of the Project Redesign program offered by the New York
State Education Department; participation in Bronx Day;
rezoning of one school whose students had been transferred
to the newly built I.S. 162; and supervision of a mini school
by the principal of an adjacent school.
These topics, all within the competence of the Board,
aroused very little controversy. The issues that aroused
the most emotion and the most heated discussion were those
over which neither the Board nor the community. Superintendent
had control. One such issue was the recurrent demand by
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by community members for an increase in the number of black
and Puerto Rican teachers and supervisors. The Community Board
and the Community Superintendent had only limited power in
this area. They were bound by the requirements of the cen
tral Board and by union contracts. Nonetheless at many
meetings it was the subject that provoked the most intense
interest.
It can be said that the community, through the
Community School Board, did have a role in decision making,
and, to that extent, decentralization has helped in the
integration of school and community. But the range of issues
that are within the powers of the Community School Board
is restricted to such an extent that the sense of effective
participation is neutralized by a sense of frustration.
Staff Members Drawn From the Community
A significant development in the composition of the
staffs of schools in District Seven is the number of para
professionals employed in thfe. classroom and in various
other capacities associated with the schools. There are
approximately five hundred paraprofessionals, all of whom
are black or Puerto Rican, and all of whom live in the
community, employed in District Seven. They were referred
by the anti poverty agencies such as the South Bronx Community
Corporation and the Hunts Point Community Corporation, both
of which are closely identified with the community and were
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appointed by the Community School Board and the community
Superintendent.
Paraprofessionals are employed as teachers' aides,
school aides, student aides, homework helpers, educational
assistants, and family assistants. In Project Success (a
program funded under Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act) for example, educational assistants
are an integral part of the program, the purpose of which
is to provide help to pupils with low reading scores.
The educational assistants receive special training in the
use of programmed reading materials. They work not only with
the professional staff and the pupils, but also with parents
in parent workshops and open meetings during which the
program is explained and discussed.
Another category of paraprofessional is the family
assistant. The family assistants are employed under the
Strenghtened Early Childhood Program, which is also funded
by Title I of the ESEA. The family assistants encourage
parents to come to school, to join the activities, and to
become involved, particularly in those workshops that cover
material with which their children may be having difficulty
and need help. If a child has been absent, a family assistant
visits the home, brings homework, and tries to find out when
the child will return to school. The fact that the para
professionals are part of the community and are, in many
instances, bilingual, makes them invaluable in this work.
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The paraprofessional, therefore, is a clearly
recognizable integrating link between the community and
the school
Relationship Among Parents, Community, and
the Professional Staff
The principals and the professional staffs of the local
schools have, for the most part, made a conscientious effort
to attract parents into the schols and to persuade them
to become involved in one or more of the many problems and
activities that have been made available. Some of the
porgrams are primarily social. Family rooms are maintained
in which refreshments are served and there are facilities
for sewing and arts and crafts.
Some of the programs, on the other hand, are primarily
educational. Workshops are held to familiarize parents with
the school curriculum. Parents are invited to school events,
assemblies, lectures, and art shows. They are invited to go
on trips with the children's classes. The use of the
school's library facilities was offered to parents.
Several of the schools asked parents to serve on the
working committees of the school. Parents, for example, have
been asked to serve on committees that are evaluating,
reviewing, and selecting texts and supplies. Parents are
invited to attend faculty conferences and to join in the
discussion.
Nevertheless, progress in the direction of bringing
about a more broadly based participation on the part of
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parents and community in the schools has been slow. The
response to the various programs and activities that have
been offered has not reflected the entire school population.
This limited response cannot be attributed to lack of
interest. Educational workshops conducted by United Bronx
Parents are usually well attended. There are, however,
a number of factors that might account for the difference in
response. The United Bronx Parents is a grass-roots organi
zation thoroughly integrated with the community, particularly
the Puerto Rican community. Parents receive a stipend of
$7.00 for each session they attend to offset the cost of
baby sitters and transportation. All workshops are con
ducted in Spanish as well as in English, and all text material
used in connection with these sessions are printed in Spanish
as well as in English.
In brief, U.B.P.'s approach is simple, direct, and
delivered in language that community people understand.
There is an underlying difference in philosophy between
the efforts of the professional staff and those of the
United Bronx Parents. The efforts of the professional staff
are directed toward inducing the community to improve its
understanding of the school system and to adjust to it.
U.B.P., on the other hand, places its emphasis on the
failures of the system, and demands that the system under-
Volume I, No. 3, p. 4; Annual Report of Community School
Board Seven.
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standing of the school system and to adjust to it. U.B.P.,
on the other hand, places its emphasis on the failures
of the system, and demands that the system understand
and adjustto the needs of the community. Until this basic
conflict is resolved, progress in the direction of integra
ting school and community is likely to continue to be slow.
Another problem of parent and community relations is
that of bringing blacks and Puerto Ricans together. Unfor
tunately, conflict is built into black and Puerto Rican
relations by virtue of the organizational design created
by the Decentralization Law. The method of selecting
Community School Board members and allocating power is con
ducive to a highly divisive "winner-take-all" psychology.
The dominant group on the Community School Board can,
within limits, dictate curriculum, establish priorities,
influence staff appointments, and determine the allocation
of funds, with little opposition from the minority. At pre
sent, the Puerto Ricans dominate the Community School Board
of District Seven because they control four of the nine
seats on the Board. This is especially significant since
only a majority (five votes) is required to carry all
resolutions, including the election of new Board members.
Moreover, the conflict caused by the organizational design
of the community school district is reinforced by the design
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of the community's anti-poverty agencies through over
lapping memberships. As in the case of the community School
district, the structure of the anti-poverty agencies also
fosters a "winner-take-all" psychology. The anti-poverty
agencies control such job opportunities as the assignment
of paraprofessionals, and the allocation of anti-poverty
funds for community projects.
It is true that, given the organizational design of
the community school districts and of the anti-poverty
agencies, the struggle for power, money and jobs among
community factions might occur in any community. In the
poverty areas, however, where these agencies are practically
the only source of power, money and jobs, the struggle
becomes more intense.
Unless the structure is changed to facilitate a more
equitable distribution of resources, it is unlikely that
relations among factions in the community will improve. And
until relations improve, it is unlikely that community members
will act in a unified way for the benefit of the whole community
vis-a-vis education, or for that matter, any of the many other
pressing needs of the community.
Power Equalization
One of the most controversial aspects of the 1969
Decentralization Law concerned the extent to which it contri
buted, or did not contribute to the redistribution of power
throughout the school system. Marilyn Gittell, political
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scientist and former director of the Institute for Community
Studies at Queens College, views the movement for urban
school reform through expanded community control as an
attempt to achieve a new balance of power by introducing
competition into the system. Local groups are seen as
competing with professionals for power, resources and a larger
share in the decision-making process.
Proponents of community control are concerned with a
redistribution of power not only for political reasons, but
also for the impact that redistribution would have on the
educational processes in the community. Mario Fantini, who
headed the staff which prepared the Bundy Report contends:
the realignment of the participants in public education
could produce rich yields for all the main participants.
For the parents, a tangible grasp on the destiny of
their children and opening to richer meaning for their
own lives. For professionals, surcease from an
increasingly negative community climate and, more
positively, new allies in their task. For the
children, a school system responsive to their needs,
resonant with their personal style and affirmative in
its expectations of them. And finally, there is the
goal of participation for its own sake.
On the other hand, such opponents of community control as
Albert Shanker, President of the United Federation of Teachers,
have fought to confine decentralizaition to a purely administra-
Marilyn Gittell, "The Balance of Power and the Community
School," in Henry M. Levin (ed.), Community Control of Schools
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 115.
2
Mario Fantini, "Community Participation," in Gittell
and Hevesi, Politics of Urban Education, p. 337.
-103-
tive device with a minimum of community control.
The question is: To what extent have the proponents
of community control been successful in achieving their
objectives, and to what extent have its opponents been able
to block them? The answer is far from being clear. At this
point, the situation, in a nutshell, is that the community
has far more power than it had, but far less than it wants.
The Community School Board wields far more power
than was ever possessed by the Local School Board that it
superseded. It has taken the initiative on such policies as
hiring more black and Puerto Rican principals and supervisors,
introducing bilingual classes into every school in the district,
and selecting programs requiring the involvement of parapro-
fessionals. The Board has also become deeply involved in
practically every facet of school operations. For example,
a committee of the Community Board screens all applicants
for supervisory positions, i.e., principals, assistant princi
pals, and so forth. Only after this screening, are names
submitted to the community Superintendent for appointment.
The involvement of the Community Board in operations
is supported by the fact that the community Superintendent
will take no action without consulting the Board or apprising
them of his actions by memo. The community Superintendent's
role vis-a-vis the Community School Board has been reduced
to one of implementation and support rather than one of
leadership.
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Because of the powers granted to the Community School
Board, the community, to whom the Board is ultimately
accountable, has also gained in power. Policy decisions,
confirmation of appointments and budget revisions, are
presented to community members at the monthly meetings of
the Community School Board before the Board takes action.
Parents at the local schools have more opportunities to
make their needs and opinions known to the Community School
Board through the Board member who is assigned to the
particular school. No principal or supervisor is appointed
to a school until the parents of that school have been
consulted and have indicated their approval. No teacher
is granted tenure without prior consultation with the parents
of the school in which he or she has been teaching.
Not all of the actions taken by the community and
the Community Board have been in the direction of consoli
dating their power at the expense of the professional staff.
There have also been steps taken by the Board to enlarge the
policy-making role of teachers and supervisors. School
councils and special-interest committees have been organized
to evaluate programs and procedures, to plan and initiate
improvements, and, to particpate in policy making. Teachers
have been invited to serve on the Redesign Committee, which
will work with the State Education Department in Albany,
New York and with district headquarters personnel to develop
structures and new educational techniques for the district.
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Teachers and supervisors are represented on the advisory
committee concerned with allocation of Title I and State
and Urban Education Program funds.
On the other hand, the inescapable reality of decen
tralization is the imbalance of power between the Community
School Board and the central Board of Education. It is this
imbalance of power that puts control of funds, contract
negotiations, standards for teachers and pupils, curriculum,
and even control over the actions of Community Board members
in the hands of the central Board that gives credence to
U.F.T. president, Albert Shanker's contention that the
Decentralization Law was a defeat for the concept of
broad community participation contained in the Bundy
Report, which led to the present legislation.
To a large extent, the imbalance that now exists can be
traced to the philosophy and actions of the "interim" Board,
a structure that departs in almost every essential character
istic not only from the Bundy model, but also from the model
originally conceived by the State Legislature. A change in
that structure could bring a radical change in the balance
of power between the Community School Board and the central
Board. As Dr. Marilyn Gittell points out, any change that
would increase the role of the Mayor and reduce the role of
the central Board would help to produce a more equitable
distribution of power.1 Dr. Gittell has also acknowledged
Gittell, Community Control Of Schools, p. 126.
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however, that the Mayor refused to play that role after
he was burned so badly at Ocean Hill-Brownsville.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
Two basic concepts have been evident since the be
ginning of the controversies that finally culminated in the
passage of the 1969 Decentralization Law. One is the concept
of administrative decentralization, and the other is community
control. Administrative decentralization had been advocated
by study after study of the New York City school system.
In fact, the very existence of local school boards was an
acknowledgement of the necessity for some measure of local
participation in an overly centralized system.
For a long period of time, even administrative
decentralization received little active support. It was only
when the militant concept of community control appeared on
the horizon that administrative decentralization became a
more palatable alternative. As a result, the 1969 Decentra
lization Law does reflect some administrative changes that
had been advocated for many years by liberal, middle-of-the-
road administrators. Ironically enough, it owes its passage,
at least in part, to the efforts of the so-called militants,
who, with some justification, have felt little sense of
victory in its passage.
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The Decentralization Law as it was finally enacted,
was the result of compromises and concessions designed to
satisfy, or at least to placate, the many powerful interests
whose claims, according to the Bundy Report, were to have
been subordinated to the educational needs of children.
By the same token, however, none of these interests was
completely satisfied, and some were completely dissatisfied
with the final result. Although it may be too early to judge
the effectiveness of the new system in terms of its educa
tional outputs, it is not too early to examine the workings
of the system itself in terms of poorly ordered priorities
and limited preparation and planning for the changes that
were to take place.
The indicators of effectiveness in this inquiry do
not show that great change has taken place during the early
years of decentralization. The average reading scores for
District Seven actually showed a slight decline according
to the tests given in both 1971 and 1972. In only one of
the eighteen elementary schools in the district were children
in the fifth grade reading at the appropriate grade level
according to these tests. This perpetuates a pattern that
has been evident for the past several years.
There appears to be a slight decline in student
absenteeism, with attendance levels at most schools higher
than the city wide average during both 1970-71 and 1971-72.
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In 1970-71, attendance at 17 of the 22 schools in the
district was higher than the citywide average of 83.55%,
and in 1971-72, attendance at all but two of the schools
was higher than the citywide average of 83.867O.
Although district suspensions have been all but
eliminated, principal's suspensions increased by 477O during
1970-71 and by another 79%. the following year.
Based on these criteria of effectiveness, therefore,
there is little evidence of change which would support
my principal hypotheses.
Integration of School and Community
Activities involving the participation of the profes
sional staff parents, and members of the community at large
have grown. Nevertheless, these activities have succeeded
in attracting only a relatively small proportion of the
community. One reason for this is that the efforts of the
professional staff have been based on the assumption that the
community must change by improving its understanding of the
school system, its methods and procedures. Community leaders,
on the other hand, want the system to change to meet what
they consider to be community needs. This is a basic conflict
that must be resolved before school-community integration can
be realized.
Another obstacle standing in the way of school-community
integration is the fact that the community itself is divided.
The District Seven community is 65% Puerto Rican and 35%
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Black. The role of the Blacks, who once provided local leader
ship, has been challenged by the Puerto Rican majority. In
a number of instances, Puerto Ricans have superseded blacks
in key positions. They now dominate the community School
Board, and within the limitations of jurisdiction, the Board
does have the power to make decisions in several highly
sensitive areas. One such area is staff selection.
Even though blacks are seriously under-represented
as teachers and supervisors, Puerto Ricans enjoy even less
representation in proportion to their numbers. Therefore,
when pressure is exerted by the community for more black
and Puerto Rican teachers and supervisors, the Community
Board is particularly sensitive to pressures for more
Spanish-speaking teachers.
Curriculum is another sensitive area. The Community
School Board, for example, has placed a high priority on bi
lingual instruction. This, however, involves an allocation
of resources for programs that have a very low priority among
black members of the community. Until the community is able
to resolve some of these internal differences and unite in
the formulation of common goals, it is unlikely that integra
tion of the community school district with the community as




Under decentralization, there has been a substantial
realignment of power with respect to the relationship of the
Community Board to the professional staff, the relationship of
teachers and principals to parents and community members, and
of professionals to laymen in general. There exists, however,
a serious imbalance of power that has its roots in the com
munity itself, an imbalance that was touched on earlier in
discussing the significance of ethnicity.
District Seven has limited resources in terms of
money, jobs, and opportunities for personal achievement. Those
resources that exist are concentrated among community poverty
agencies, the community school system, the Model Cities program
and similar agencies. In those agencies that require maximum
feasible participation on the part of community members,
competition for the control of resources is largely along
ethnic lines, in this instance Black vs. Puerto Rican.
Allocation of resources, for the most part, is on the basis
of "winner-takes-all." The combination of scarce resources
and a "more-less" philosophy produces a conflict situation
in the community school district that has been made more
severe by the method of selecting Board Members.
The Decentralization Law provides for the direct
election of Community School Boards by members of the community.
The Bundy Report had opposed such a procedure as being con-
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ducive to community conflict. The Bundy Report had recom
mended that six of the Board members be elected by representa
tives of the parents and five appointed by the Mayor. This
recommendation, designed to prevent the balance of power from
shifting too far in one direction, was ignored. The result,
as predicted, was bitter community conflict. Unless pro
cedures are instituted to maintain equilibrium, the community
school district will continue to be diverted from educational
goals by power struggles that have their origins in community
politics.
Another serious imbalance of power exists with
respect to the Community School Board vis a vis the central
Board. Under existing arrangements, the Community Board
has well defined responsibilities without adequate authority,
whereas the "interim" central Board has broad authority with
out clearly defined responsibility. Not only are the Community
Boards under pressure from their constituents to develop
creative and innovative programs that will produce results,
but they are also the targets of criticism from the opponents
of community control, such as UFT President, Albert Shanker,
for their failure to do so. And yet, the Decentralization
Law has placed control of funds, authority to negotiate con
tracts, ultimate jurisdiction over curriculum and standards
for pupils and teachers, and even control over the actions
of Community Board members in the hands of the central Board.
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Even the manner of selecting the central Board as originally
prescribed by law was so unrepresentative that it was set
aside by the courts.
At some future date, when the Legislature will once
again consider procedures for selecting the central agency,
it will have the opportunity to adjust the imbalance that
now exists between the powers of the Community School Board
and those of the central Board. A suggestion has already
been presented by the State Board of Regents to eliminate
the central Board of Education entirely and substitute a
single commissioner of education, who would be appointed by
the Mayor. It is unlikely that this radical restructuring
will take place, but even a less radical change in the
structure of the central agency could result in a far more
favorable balance of power for the Community School Boards.
Any change that would increase the power of the Mayor and
reduce that of the central Board would strengthen the Community
Boards.
The Decentralization Law As An
Instrument of Social Change
The fact that the first years of decentralization
produced no significant changes in either educational or
administrative performance in District Seven is not, in itself,
surprising. The absence of any significant trends in those
directions, however, cannot help but provoke questions as to
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whether the 1969 Decentralization Law has provided the
school system with a structure that encourages constructive
change, particularly in poverty areas such as District Seven.
The Decentralization Law had its origins in the Bundy
Report, and the Bundy Report predicated its recommendations on
the assumption that the schools of New York had become
dangerously separated from the local communities. The changes
the Report proposed were in the direction of reconnecting the
schools and their communities in order to satisfy the learning
needs of children; needs that apparently were not being met.
In making its recommendations, the Bundy Panel attempted
to reconcile the concept of administrative decentralization
with those of community control by incorporating features
of both into a total system. The central Board of Education
was given the function of establishing general policies,
providing those services that lent themselves to more
efficient central control, and assisting the community districts
with those support services they might request from the central
Board. A City Superintendent of Schools, selected by the
central Board, was assigned the responsibility for planning
the future development of the community school system and
for overseeing the maintenance of standards.
Sweeping powers were delegated to the Community School
Boards over primary and secondary education. These powers
included budget formulation and control of expenditures,
selection of personnel, and determination of curriculum
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policies.
Members of the community, parents and non-parents
alike, were to have a role in selecting and serving as
members of Community School Boards. The Community School
Boards, in turn, were to have a role in the selection of the
members of the central Board of Education.
A key feature of the design was the unifying role
assigned to the Mayor. He was to participate in the selection
of Board members at the community level and also in the
selection of the members of the central Board. These
recommendations were designed to remove the Mayor from his
isolated position and to give him a more important role and
greater responsibility for public education.
Instead of a well integrated system, however, the
Decentralization Law produced a piecemeal set of arrangements
that clearly showed the effects of compromise and concessions
to pressure. The misgivings of the Bundy Report about the
direct election of Community School Board members went unheeded.
As a result, there is every indication that the Panel's fears
concerning community conflict are already being realized. The
recommendations for a more active role for the Mayor were
simply disregarded, so the community school districts have
been deprived of what might have been an important force for
moderating conflict within the district. Furthermore, a more
active1, role for the Mayor might have contributed to a more
equitable distribution of power between the Community School
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Boards and the central Board of Education.
The scope of activities delegated to the Community
School Boards was reduced, particularly in the critical
areas of budget and finance, staff selection, and curriculum.
Recommendations on the selection and functions of the central
Board were ignored so that the relationship of the central
Board to the Community Board is restrictive rather than
supportive.
The recommendations for compensation for the members
of the Community School Boards were not implemented until
July 1972. As a result, the long hours and lack of compensation
tended to discourage Board membership and to undermine the
stability of the Community Board. On the other hand, the law
did provide compensation for the members of the central
Board of Education, even though no such recommendation had
been made. The result has been to encourage even greater
involvement by members of the central Board of Education in the
day-to-day operation of the school system, and reluctance to
relinquish any part of the power of authority they enjoy on
the "interim" Board.
In short, the Decentralization Law has failed to pro
vide the school system with a structure that is any more
workable than the one that is superseded. It has not replaced
an ailing school system with either a system of administrative
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decentralization or of community control or a combination
of both. The structure that has emerged is conducive neither
to the achievement of organizational objectives of the type
identified with adminstrative decentralization nor the achieve
ment of political objectives of the type identified with
community control.
Some Further Questions
From one point of view, the concept of community con
trol is a relatively new one. From another, community control
represents a return to an earlier form of organization that
was abandoned as communities were absorbed into larger
political entities. In any case, the arguments for its adoption
or rejection as an administrative form have been hampered by
inadequate data.
The decentralization of the New York City school
system represents a pioneering effort in contemporary community
control. It provides one of many possible models for decentra
lization. As in the case of many pioneering efforts, this one
provides some answers, and, at the same time, provokes many
questions for further study.
Is The Community School Board Repeating The Patterns
And Pathologies Of The Central Board Of Education?
Unfortunately, there are indications that some of the
"manifestations of bureaucratic pathology" under the centralized
school system might be gaining a foothold in the Community
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School Board. Among them are reluctance to delegate authority
and responsibility; empire buidling; fear of loss of control;
and sensitivity to criticism. If allowed to continue, these
tendencies could seriously impair the effectiveness of the
Community Board.
What Have Been The Effects Of The Inclusion Of The
Community School Board In The Community Power Structure?
An inquiry into the relation of the Community School
Board to community action groups and community anti-poverty
agencies could provide some valuable insights into the
community power structure and its effects on decisions
involving the community school district. Such an inquiry,
for example, might include an anlaysis of the complex of
interlocking memberships and relationships. This is important
because of the possibilities for bargaining between community
action groups and agencies and the Community School Board. It
could also include an evaluation of the effects of a decision
made in one community agency on the decision-making process
in another. It might also address itself to such questions
as: To what extent have shifts in the leadership of influential
community action groups affected the decisions of the
Community School Board? What difference does it make for school
effectiveness?
To'o What Extent Are The Findings Of The Present Study
ipplicable To Other Community School Districts?
Comparative studies in which the findings on District
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Seven could be compared with those of other community school
districts whose characteristics might be very different,
would offer a broader base for future policy makers. Such
research could focus on the performance of children, of the
professional staff, or of the Community School Board. Through
such analysis, for example, it might be possible to isolate
variables most closely associated with the success or failure
of a Community School Board. Also such comparisons might help
to develop and test criteria for the evaluation of Community
School Boards.
What Are The Implications Of This Study For The
Decentralization Of Other City Systems'?
Although the present study confined itself to the impact
of the 1969 Decentralization Law and the concept of community
control on a single district of one of the largest and most
important of the City's agencies, the findings have broader
implications. Pressure is increasing for the decentralization
of other major City agencies (Fire, Police, Sanitation).
Recommendations
In order to increase the effectiveness of the community
school system, the stalemate on administrative decentralization
as opposed to political decentralization (community control)
must be resolved. A move in the direction of administrative
decentralization would certainly not receive much support
from the community. Also, such a move would be viewed as
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repressive and would only serve to increase tensions within
the community.
Given the issue of the need to protect the democratic
rights of clients, which is of paramount concern, particularly
in the ghetto, community control is probably politically
more practicable, if not the more equitable direction in which
to move at the present time. It is with this consideration in
mind that the following suggestions are made.
Community School Districts Should Be Given More Authority
To Determine Their Own Objectives And To Establish
Measures of Performance
Although it is true that in ghetto communities, among
the objectives sought in the community school is the satis
faction of such needs as a sense of self-worth, pride of
heritage and the restoration of confidence, these are legiti
mate goals of education. They are not separate from tradition
al educational objectives. Fears that Community School Boards
in poverty areas will be attracted by radical educational
experiments and will lower educational standards are poorly
founded. If anything, such communities are conservative in
their demands. They are seriously concerned with the compe
tence of their children in reading, writing, and arithmetic,
since these skills are directly related to earning a livelihood.
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The Ability Of The Community School Districts To
Develop And Introduce Innovative Programs"
Should Be Reinforced
The development and implementation of programs to
achieve the objectives desired by the community school district
will require a flexibility and a capacity for innovation that
have not yet been seen. To a large extent, this lack of
innovative activity is the result of constraints imposed by
the provisions of the Decentralization Law itself. These
constraints should be reduced if the community district's
potential for innovation is to be realized.
Marilyn Gittell has described three categories of fac
tors that are related to innovation:
1. Participation of the community in school policy
making. School systems tend to stay at rest
unless external forces upset their equilibrium.
Most pressures for change are exogenous to the
system; they originate in the community in which
the system functions.
2. An administrative organization that encourages and
is supportive of change. The structure must be
adaptable and capable of adjusting its operation
to new objectives and new methods. An organic
structure, for example, in which authority is
identified with expertise rather than with hier
archical position is more flexible than a mechanistic
one and, therefore, more conducive to innovation.
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Participative management in which power is
equalized is an important means of reducing
resistance to change.
3. The allocation of new financial resources to
implement change. Existing funds are committed
to a given pattern of organization; once these
funds are committed, they are difficult to shift.
Gittell's analysis suggests a number of approaches to
reinforcing the community district's ability to innovate.
One approach, the participation of the community in policy
making, comes closest to being realized. Although there are
numerous opportunities for community participation, however,
the range of issues over which the community district has
jurisdiction is severely restricted.
A second strategy - an administrative structure con
ducive to change, involves significant limitations that are
not easily corrected. From the Community School Board on
down, the emphasis is on hierarchical position rather than
on expertise. Not that expertise is absent, but there is a
lack of confidence and trust that goes through each level of
authority and is transmitted from level to level. This lack
of confidence orginates in the limitations that have been
placed on the Community School Boards in recruiting staff.
These constraints, for the most part, were written into the
Decentralization Law at the insistence of the United Federation
of Teachers and the Council of Supervisory Associations. Both
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organizations have made it quite clear that they do not
trust the community.
What is needed is more latitude for the Community
Board in the selection of the community Superintendent, for
the Superintendent in his selection of principals and super
visors, and for principals in the selection of teachers.
This would tend to increase confidence, and to encourage
a wider dispersal of authority and a reduction of resistance
to change. It is ironic that the Decentralization Law
recognizes the desirability of greater latitude in the
selection of teachers when a school's reading scores fall
into the lower 45% of the City's schools. Why should it be
necessary for a school to be at extremes before a Community
Board can depart from the rigid selection requirements
prescribed by law? The very fact that the procedures can be
waived in an emergency suggests that the basis for the
requirements is the maintenance of teacher security rather
than the maintenance of high levels of competence.
The third approach to innovation involves the alloca
tion of financial resources. A major constraint on innovation
is the lack of financial resources to plan and implement new
programs. The community districts receives an allocation
of funds from the central Board, but over 90% of these funds is
mandated for salaries for teachers and administrators. Out of
approximately $30 million allocated to District Seven, about
$27.5 million is appropriated for salaries, $500,000 for the
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district headquarters (i.e., the Community School Board, the
community Superintendent, and their respective staffs), and the
remaining $2 million for all other purposes, including day care
centers, after school centers, and recreation centers.
As Gittell had indicated, once funds are committed
to an established pattern, they are difficult to shift.
Nevertheless, the Community School Board should be given more
leeway in determining how funds are allocated to them. It
might well be that if a portion of the community district's
funds mandated for salaries could be diverted by the
Community School Board to innovative teaching methods, better
results could be achieved without increasing the total amount
spent for teaching.
The Community School Boards Should Have A Role In The
Selection Of The Central Agency
If the Community School Board's authority to establish
objectives and evaluate performance is to be enlarged, and
if its capability for innovation is to be reinforced, its
relationship to the central Board must be redefined. As it
now stands the role of the central Board vis-a-vis the
Community Board is part watchdog and part competitor. What
its function should be is to provide service and support to
the community school districts. One way in which the
redefinition of the role of the central Board could be
achieved is by giving the Community School Boards an active
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role in the selection of the central agency.
The Bundy Report recommended that the central agency
comprise partly members chosen by an assembly of Community
School Board presidents, and partly members appointed by the
Mayor. The State Board of Regents has recommended that the
central Board be eliminated entirely and replaced by a single
commissioner appointed by the Mayor. The approach to the
Bundy Report is more compatible with the concept of a
community school system.
The Method Of Selecting Members For The Community
School Board Should Be Revise"?
The present method of selecting members for the
Community School Boards by direct election is conducive to
conflict, and can inhibit the ability of the Board to function
effectively. If the community is divided along racial and
ethnic lines, as in District Seven, the majority can dominate
the Board to such an extent that minority interests can be
completely submerged.
Furthermore, if there are resignations, the Board can
be completely immobilized. The Decentralization Law gave the
Boards the authority to appoint replacements for those of its
members who resign before the expiration of their term of office.
If two members resign, and the dominant group can still muster
five votes, the Board will at least be able to reach decisions.
If, however, two resignations leave the Board with a four-to-
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three split so that neither group can muster the five votes,
needed for a decision, the Board may not only be unable to
replace the members who resigned, but also may be unable
to make any decisions at all.
Finally, the method of electing members of the
Community School Board does not provide adequate assurance of
the continuity of policies and practices. This can be a
matter of serious concern in poverty areas, where there is
a high degree of mobility among the residents, and in transi
tional areas, where the composition of the population may be
changing rapidly. Lack of continuity causes anxiety among
the staff, from the community Superintendent on down, not
only because of job security, but also because of poorly
defined guidelines and the lack of set priorities.
What would be preferable is a combination of elected
and appointed members along the lines recommended in the
Bundy Report. In a Board so constituted, the probability
of a prolonged deadlock would be minimized and a degree of
continuity would be assured. Furthermore, if the appointments
were made by the Mayor as suggested in the Bundy Report, this
would provide another link between the Community School Boards
and the system as a whole.
Under the 1969 Decentralization Law, community control
has not shown itself to the best advantage. The Community
School Board's vulnerability to criticism from both inside
and outside the community has served to hamper effective
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performance. There is no evidence to support my principal
hypotheses, mainly because of the limited application of
community control. The concept actually has not really been
tried. The community should be given the opportunity to develop
the techniques and procedures necessary to make it work.
The first step would be to provide appropriate mechanisms
for community control. Then hopefully, sufficient time
would be allowed for a reasonable test of its effectiveness.
In its present form, the 1969 Decentralization Law does
not provide the suitable structure for testing that effective
ness. It is important that these deficiencies be corrected not
only for the sake of the New York City schools, but for public
education all over the United States.
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